International Tax Law Between Loyalty, Exit, And Voice

Tarcisio Diniz Magalhaes (Antwerp), International Tax Law Between Loyalty, Exit, and Voice, 44 Dalhousie L.J. 49 (2021):

Discourse on the merits and pitfalls of multilateral cooperation for advancing justice in international tax law have recently re-emerged in the literature. Some tax scholars, even while criticizing global projects like the OECD/G20 initiatives on base erosion, profit shifting and the tax challenges arising from the digitalisation of the economy, insist that cooperative efforts herald a step in the right direction. Others contest the feasibility of international cooperation or its value for developing countries.

Drawing on Albert Hirschman’s oft-cited framework for actor behaviour under institutional malperformance, this article shows that there are three alternatives for those discontented with the status quo: to remain loyal despite disagreeing (cooperation); exit and perhaps form a competing regime (competition); or try to change the existing rules by speaking up (un-cooperation). The article concludes that the interaction of these options (contested cooperation) is an integral part of today’s transnational tax law order.