Friday, October 23, 2020
Weekly SSRN Tax Article Review And Roundup: Roberts Reviews Holderness's Insidious Regulatory Taxes
This week, Tracey Roberts (Cumberland) reviews a recently posted work by Hayes Holderness (Richmond), Insidious Regulatory Taxes.
In Insidious Regulatory Taxes, Hayes Holderness takes issue with state legislatures’ use of taxes to regulate individual behavior. He clarifies that regulatory taxes are “insidious” when a state legislature chooses to use a tax in order to avoid the level of state and federal constitutional scrutiny imposed on direct regulation. Federal and state courts have generally deferred to legislatures on tax matters because the U.S. Constitution and state constitutions grant legislature the “power of the purse.” Judicial attempts to curtail this power may be viewed as a violation of the separation of powers doctrine. Holderness argues that while judicial deference may be appropriate when the legislators’ goals are to raise revenue, that deference is not justified when legislators are acting with a regulatory purpose and when their goal in using a tax is to skirt the level of scrutiny applied to direct regulation.
Holderness draws upon tax expenditure analysis to provide a framework (a) to guide the legislature on the use of tax as a regulatory mechanism, and (b) to guide the courts in the degree of deference they employ. Stanley Surrey, the Secretary of the Treasury in the late 1960s and 1970s, developed the concept of tax expenditures in response to the increasing complexity of the tax system and the compounding difficulty of tax administration. Congress had begun to use the income tax to provide subsidies to special interest groups. Surrey was concerned that tax subsidies undermine revenues, undercut fair and efficient administration, systematically advantage high income taxpayers, and create distrust in the tax system. However, Holderness is concerned with a problem that occupied little of Surrey’s writings: negative tax expenditures. Negative tax expenditures produce more revenue than would be gained simply from measuring net income.
Holderness argues that legislatures should weigh the following factors in deciding whether to use tax as a regulatory tool: (1) expertise relative to the matter being regulated, (2) existing legal structures (and institutional competence in administering the law) and (3) public reaction to the law / behavioral responses. Scholars have applied similar rubrics to analyze the income tax system as an alternative mechanism to administer public benefits and to address Surrey’s concerns about complexity and administrability. However, most regulatory taxes are excise taxes, not income taxes. Excise taxes do not involve the same degree of complexity as the measurement of income, the eligibility verification for exemptions, exclusions, deductions and credits, and the clarification of the proper tax unit / household size. Excise taxes require a determination of: (1) What are these items? (2) Who owns / produced them? (3) How much do they weigh / what is their volume? Holderness could further clarify the application of the tax expenditure analysis by working through specific problems that have actually arisen in state administration of controlled substance taxes.
Holderness argues that courts should give less deference to tax statutes (a) when the legislature is using tax to regulate and (b) when there are statutory or constitutional provisions that would have created impediments for direct command-and-control regulation. The first difficulty the courts will face, and this is discussed in the existing taxing power cases, is how to discern legislative intent. Respected judicial doctrines of statutory interpretation have been developed in opposition to reviewing legislative history precisely because it is so difficult to discern the hearts and minds of a group comprised of hundreds of legislators. When Alexander Hamilton wrote the Federalist papers arguing for a federal taxing power, he contemplated taxes on alcohol as a great source of revenue, acknowledging that they would also have the beneficial effect of reducing drunkenness. Should this statement trigger additional scrutiny of alcohol excises? Note that excise taxes were the nation’s primary source of revenue along with tariffs on imported goods until the passage of the 16th Amendment authorizing an income tax in 1913.
Second, all taxes have some behavioral effects. As an economic matter, the revenue-raising capacity of an excise tax is often inextricably intertwined with its attraction as an object of commerce (and the related danger to society). “Sin” taxes are often imposed on goods that have an addictive quality. Individuals have an inelastic response to taxes on addictive substances. State legislatures turn to sin taxes during economic downturns specifically because they provide a stable source of revenue; they are superior revenue-raisers because they do not change individual behavior.
Third, the rubric employs a form of cost-benefit analysis as to whether one agency or another is in a better position to assess the harms and the benefits of the activity being regulated. If the main concern is about the loss of constitutionally protected rights, cost-benefit analysis is inapposite. Cost-benefit analysis has historically run into difficulty placing value on human life. It will perform no better in assessing the value of essential liberties. The Bill of Rights exists precisely to trump cost-benefit analysis; it protects the interests of (and costs to) the minority from the will of (and the benefits to) the majority.
Holderness argues that taxes are an incursion on freedom. In most cases, however, taxes pose less threat to freedom because the taxed activity is still allowed. Activities that are subject to direct regulation may be banned, or limited in ways that drive producers and consumers from the market. Taxes, as a form of market regulation, grant those that are subject to the tax the discretion to decide how to comply. Taxes are generally favored by regulated industries because each company can evaluate how to comply at least cost (invest in abatement or pay the tax). Additional detail about the ways that the courts are (mis)handling the constitutional and other challenges to regulatory would be helpful to focus these debates.
Finally, legislatures often impose excise taxes on items that have a diffuse, but significant, effects on public health, safety, and welfare, such as scheduled drugs, tobacco, alcohol, firearms, and emissions. Public health and safety are common pool resources, not unlike air, water, and the global atmosphere. Applying his analysis in the context of taxes to control the trafficking of illicit substances, Holderness advocates for legislatures to impose higher criminal penalties rather than imposing controlled substance taxes. However, criminal penalties do not actually offset the societal harm or the social costs incurred from the distribution and availability of the drugs. Even if higher criminal and civil penalties and enhanced enforcement may reduce the presence of cigarette smoke, alcohol-related deaths, fire arms-related violence, and pollution-related illness and death, they do not provide recompense for those who are harmed. The taxing power permits legislatures to exact payment equal to the social harms imposed by the flow of these items. What could be a more important revenue raising power than to charge the costs of activities that shift risks and costs to the public to those engaging in that activity?
Taxes and regulations can have unintended consequences. Holderness is clearly concerned about the way that the tax authorities choose to enforce the law against the most vulnerable and least enfranchised. Narrowing the argument to focus on inequity in administration and enforcement could clarify the problem and prevent the remedy he proposes from itself generating unintended consequences.
Here’s the rest of this week’s SSRN Tax Roundup:
- Babatunde Akinmade (Bournemouth), Rebalancing the Arguments for Taxation of Wealth: Evidence from France (October 17, 2020)
- Ivo Bakota (Max Planck), Capital Income Taxation with Portfolio Choice, MEA Discussion Paper No. 15-2020 (October 20, 2020)
- Ivo Bakota (Max Planck), Firm Leverage and Wealth Inequality, MEA Discussion Paper No. 14-2020
- Siraj G. Bawa and Nam T. Vu (Miami Ohio), International Effects of Corporate Tax Cuts on Income Distribution, 28 Review of International Economics 1164 (2020)
- Rajeev R. Bhattacharya, Objective Measures of Market Efficiency; Applications to Securities Class Actions and Valuations, 16 Berkeley Business Law Journal (2019)
- Hamid Beladi (UT San Antonio), Chen Cheng (Zhengzhou), May Hu (RMIT) and Yuan Yuan (Huazhong), Unemployment Governance, Labour Cost and Earnings Management: Evidence from China, 43 The World Economy 2526 (2020)
- Youssef Benzarti (UC Santa Barbara), Estimating the Costs of Filing Tax Returns and the Potential Savings from Policies Aimed at Reducing These Costs, NBER Working Paper No. w27946 (October 19, 2020)
- Katarzyna Anna Bilicka (Utah State; Oxford) Real Responses to Anti-tax Avoidance: Evidence from the UK Worldwide Debt Cap (October 17, 2020)
- Katarzyna Anna Bilicka, Are Financing Constraints Binding for Investment? Evidence From a Natural Experiment, 177 Journal of Business Economics and Organizations 618 (September 2020)
- Katarzyna Anna Bilicka, Comparing UK Tax Returns of Foreign Multinationals to Matched Domestic Firms, 109 American Economic Review 2921 (2019)
- Mark Brabazon (Sydney), Partial Residence Clauses in US Treaty Practice, 74 (8) Bulletin for International Taxation 497 (2020)
- Alexis Brassey and Henry Ordower (Saint Louis), The Village of Billionaires: Fair Taxation and Redistribution Amid Relative and Absolute Poverty, 99 Tax Notes International 97 (July 6, 2020)
- Sanjit Dhami (Leicester) & Narges Hajimoladarvish (Alzahra), Mental Accounting, Loss Aversion, and Tax Evasion: Theory and Evidence, CESifo Working Paper No. 8606 (October 19, 2020)
- Karina Doorley (University College Dublin) and Claire Keane (ESRI Ireland), Tax-Benefit Systems and the Gender Gap in Income, IZA Discussion Paper No. 13786 (October 20, 2020)
- Ilanit Gavious (Ben-Gurion & Yaron Lahav (Ben-Gurion), Regulation and Dishonest Behavior: How Controlling Regulatory Mechanisms Prompt Dishonesty in Tax Consulting, Florida Tax Review, Forthcoming, (October 19, 2020)
- Chaohua Han (CASS), Xiaojun Li (British Columbia) and Jean Oi (Stanford), Repaying the State’s 'Helping Hand': The Costs of Political Connections in China (October 20, 2020)
- Yu Hao (Peking) and Kevin Zhengcheng Liu, Taxation, Fiscal Capacity, and Credible Commitment in Eighteenth‐Century China: The Effects of the Formalization and Centralization of Informal Surtaxes, 73 The Economic History Review 914-939 (2020)
- Hind Ben Khayat Zeggari Hassani (ENCG Kénitra) and Lotfi Benazzou (Ibn Tofail), Fiscal Risks Faced by Moroccan SMEs (October 19, 2020)
- Johann Hattingh (Cape Town), The Relevance of BEPS Materials for Tax Treaty Interpretation, 74 Bulletin for International Taxation 179 (2020)
- Lisa Hillmann (Gottingen), Private Firm and Shareholder Response to Dividend Taxation: Evidence from the Taxation of Corporate Minority Shareholders (October 19, 2020)
- Jun-ichi Itaya (Hokkaido) and Kenichi Kurita, Replicator Evolution of Welfare Stigma: Welfare Fraud vs. Incomplete Take-Up, CESifo Working Paper No. 8621(October 20, 2020)
- Erik M. Jensen (Case Western Reserve), Marijuana Businesses, Section 280E, and the Sixteenth Amendment, 168 Tax Notes Federal 1643 (2020), 97 Tax Notes State 929 (2020), Case Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2020-13
- Yusuf Magiya (Columbia), Predatory Rulers, Credible Commitment and Tax Compliance: How War Does Not Make the State Under Weak Rule of Law (October 19, 2020)
- Eva Mörk (Uppsala) and Mattias Nordin (Uppsala), Voting, Taxes, and Heterogeneous Preferences: Evidence from Swedish Local Elections, 32 Economics & Politics 356 (2020)
- Anthony Okafor (Louisville), Corporate Taxes and Foreign Direct Investments: An Impact Analysis, 10 Public Policy and Administration Research 51 (2020)
- Vincent Ooi (Singapore Management), Tax Considerations for Funds Structuring in Asia, 38(1) Journal of Taxation of Investments, Forthcoming (October 16, 2020)
- Henry Ordower (Saint Louis), Avoiding Federal and State Constitutional Limitations in Taxation, Julio Homem de Siqueira, et al., eds. Princípios Constitucionais Tributários (Tax Principles and Constitutional Law) Belo Horizonte, Brazil, Forthcoming, 168 Tax Notes Federal 1447 (August 24, 2020) and 97 Tax Notes State 803 (August 24, 2020)
- Jayanta Kumar Seal (Indian Institute of Foreign Trade), Consumption and Voluntary Savings Response to Service Tax (October 19, 2020)
- Krishan Bir Singh, Digital Economy And Economic Development Of India, Research Analysis and Evaluation - International Peer Reviewed Research Journal, 2020
- Lennart Stern (Paris School of Economics), Funding Global Public Good Institutions via Carbon Pricing for Aviation – A Comparison of Three Proposed Mechanisms (October 20, 2020)
- Farhad Taghizadeh‐Hesary (Tokyo), Naoyuki Yoshino (Asian Development Bank) and Sayoko Shimizu, The Impact of Monetary and Tax Policy on Income Inequality in Japan, 43 The World Economy 2600 (2020)
- Hajime Takatsuka (Osaka City), Uniform Emission Taxes, Abatement, and Spatial Disparities, 64 Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 1133 (2020)
- Tanya Y. H. Tang (Brock), An Investigation of Tax-Related Corporate Political Activity in China: Evidence from Consumption Bribery, Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Finance, Forthcoming (October 20, 2020)
- Adam B. Thimmesch (Nebraska), State Tax Conformity: The CARES Act and Beyond, 98 Tax Notes State (2020)
- Steve Pak Yeung Wu (British Columbia), Corporate Balance Sheets and Sovereign Risk Premia (October 20, 2020)
https://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof_blog/2020/10/weekly-ssrn-tax-article-review-and-roundup-roberts-reviews-holdernesss-insidious-regulatory-taxes.html