Paul L. Caron
Dean




Wednesday, December 7, 2016

Kleinbard:  The Why And How Of The Dual Business Enterprise Income Tax ('Dual BEIT')

Edward Kleinbard (USC), Capital Taxation in an Age of Inequality:

The standard view in the U.S. tax law academy remains that capital income taxation is both a poor idea in theory and completely infeasible in practice. But this ignores the first-order importance of political economy issues in the design of tax instruments. The pervasive presence of gifts and bequests renders moot the claim that the results obtained by Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976) counsel against taxing capital income in practice.

Taxing capital income is responsive to important political economy exigencies confronting the United States, including substantial tax revenue shortfalls relative to realistic government spending targets, increasing income and wealth inequality at the top end of distributions, and the surprising persistence of dynastic wealth. It also responds to a new strand of economic literature that argues that “inclusive growth” leads to higher growth.

A flat-rate (proportional) income tax on capital imposed and collected annually has attractive theoretical and political economy properties that can be harnessed in actual tax instrument design. As a proportional tax, it applies at the same marginal and effective rates to both income and losses, thereby preserving the symmetry on which rests the theoretical analysis of returns to risk. A progressive consumption tax, by contrast, abandons this, and in doing so can burden the returns to waiting. Moreover, a flat-rate capital income tax is a progressive tax in application: because only high-ability taxpayers or those who are the beneficiaries of gifts and bequests can afford to defer consumption indefinitely, the increasing “tax wedge” on savings over time introduces a measure of top-bracket progressivity along the margin of time. In other words, what some see as the fatal flaw of capital income taxation in fact is a feature, not a bug.

The separation of a taxpayer’s income into capital and labor components, and the application of separate rate schedules to each, are hallmarks of “dual income tax” instruments, of the sort explored in practice most comprehensively by several Nordic countries. Building on earlier work on dual tax systems and capital income tax structures, I propose a novel and reasonably accurate flat rate tax on capital income that builds on well-understood tax policies, that achieves integration between corporate and investor income, and that successfully distinguishes capital from labor income. I term this tax instrument the Dual Business Enterprise Income Tax, or Dual BEIT. Its virtues also include minimizing the relevance of the realization doctrine, eliminating distinctions across different forms of capital investment, and offering business enterprises a profits (consumption) tax environment in which to operate.

To make the project more tractable, the two themes just advanced – the why and the how of the Dual BEIT — are each the subject of a separate paper. This is the “why” paper. Together, the two demonstrate that the Dual BEIT satisfies theoretical concerns, once those are filtered through the political economy imperatives of the quotidian world, and is straightforward to implement and administer.

Edward Kleinbard (USC), The Right Tax at the Right Time:

The companion paper to this (Capital Taxation in an Age of Inequality) argues that a moderate flat-rate (proportional) income tax on capital imposed and collected annually has attractive theoretical and political economy properties that can be harnessed in actual tax instrument design. This paper continues the analysis by specifying in detail how such a tax might be designed.

The idea of the Dual Business Enterprise Income Tax, or Dual BEIT, is to offer business enterprises a neutral profits tax environment in which to operate, in which normal returns to capital are exempt from tax by means of an annual capital allowance termed the Cost of Capital Allowance (COCA). In turn, investors in firms include in income each year the same COCA rate, applied to their tax basis in their investments. The result is a single tax on capital income (rents plus normal returns), where the tax on normal returns is imposed directly on the least mobile class of taxpayers. Labor income continues to be taxed at progressive tax rates.

The paper considers in detail three particular design issues. First, because labor is taxed at progressive rates whose top rate exceeds the capital income rate, the Dual BEIT must specify a labor-capital income tax centrifuge, to tease apart labor from capital income when the two are intertwined in the case of the owner-entrepreneur of a closely-held firm. Second, the paper considers the theory and practice behind the choice of the COCA rate. Third, the paper specifies an international tax regime that should be attractive to firm managers yet robust to stateless income gaming.

Throughout, the emphasis is on developing pragmatic technical solutions that are implementable without profound transition issues, that are administrable, and that fairly balance theoretical desiderata against political economy realities.

https://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof_blog/2016/12/kleinbardthe-why-and-how-of-the-dual-business-enterprise-income-tax-dual-beit.html

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Comments

a flat-rate capital income tax is a progressive tax in application: because only high-ability taxpayers or those who are the beneficiaries of gifts and bequests can afford to defer consumption indefinitely,

This is an intriguing point, but it overlooks the element of choice. Most people who could scrimp and save choose not to do so. Spending now is much more fun. A tax system which rewards that choice and penalizes the saver is unfair.

Posted by: AMTbuff | Dec 7, 2016 7:40:25 AM