TaxProf Blog

Editor: Paul L. Caron, Dean
Pepperdine University School of Law

Monday, October 15, 2018

Lesson From The Tax Court: Using CDP To Stop The Collection Train

Tax Court (2017)I am not a fan of the Collection Due Process (CDP) provisions Congress stuffed into the Code in 1998.  I call them “Collection Delay Process.”  It’s not that I favor taxpayer abuse!  But I think the source of abuse is rarely bad-acting IRS employees.  Bulk processing is generally the culprit.  The combination of computer-processing and over-whelmed employees creates an assessment process that runs over taxpayers who do not understand how to stop it or slow it down and who cannot afford to hire lawyers to do that for them.  And then, the end of that assessment process starts the engine of the collection train.  CDP is designed to keep the train from going down the wrong collection track before it leaves the station.  But CDP is a badly designed mechanism.  That was my conclusion in 2009, after I studied almost 1,000 CDP cases.  I have seen nothing in the past 10 years to change my mind.  

Those who disagree with me point to cases like the one I’m blogging about today: James Loveland Jr., and Tina C. Loveland v. Commissioner, 151 T.C. No. 7 (Sept. 25, 2018), a reviewed decision written by Judge Buch.  This is one of the rare cases where the Tax Court found that the IRS had abused its discretion in deciding to proceed with collection.  Here it looks like CDP prevented the collection train from running over the Lovelands.  The case provides a good lesson for what works, and what does not work, about CDP.  Keith Fogg also has a good post on this case over at Procedurally Taxing, explaining why it is a reviewed opinion.

The case is also an interesting lesson about Tax Court Procedure.  While the case is ostensibly a ruling on an IRS motion for Summary Judgment, Judge Buch effectively grants Summary Judgment to the taxpayers...who never asked for it.  This disposition—while sensible enough---is apparently an unwritten rule of Tax Court procedure.  At least I did not see a rule.  Nothing in 121.  Maybe I missed it.  But I think the Court is silently borrowing from Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 56.

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October 15, 2018 in Bryan Camp, New Cases, Tax Practice And Procedure | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, October 8, 2018

Lesson From The Tax Court: What Is A 'Liability' For §108 Purposes?

Tax Court (2017)To qualify for the insolvency exclusion in §108(a) one has to be insolvent.  Section 108(d)(3) defines insolvency as "the excess of liabilities over the fair market value of assets."  But nothing in the Code or Regulations defines the term "liabilities."  The recent case of Richard Bryan Jackson and Nora Irene Jackson v. Commissioner, T.C. Summ. Op. 2018-43 (Sept. 17, 2018), teaches a lesson about the meaning of that word. 

In February, I wrote about Discharge of Indebtedness (DOI) Income.  I called it “The Phantom of The Tax Code.”  Readers will recall that when a taxpayer obtains a loan, the loan proceeds are not reportable as gross income, but it is not entirely clear why.  The most common reason given is that the borrowed funds do not represent a increase in wealth because they are offset by the obligation to repay.  I call this the balance sheet theory.  The logic of this theory means that when the obligation to repay is discharged or relieved by the creditor, that discharge increases the taxpayer’s wealth to the extent that it frees the taxpayer from the obligation.  I go into more detail in my February post.

Section 108(a) reflects this balance sheet theory by allowing taxpayers to exclude DOI from gross income when they are insolvent but limiting the exclusion to the amount of the insolvency at the time of the discharge. For example, if a taxpayer is discharged from $10,000 of debt at a time when the taxpayer is insolvent by $6,000, then the taxpayer can exclude $6,000 of the DOI from income but must report the remaining $4,000 as gross income. 

Today’s lesson is about what types of obligations count as liabilities for purposes of determining insolvency. It turns out that not every obligation to pay someone is a liability.  To see why, read on!

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October 8, 2018 in Bryan Camp, New Cases, Scholarship, Tax | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, October 1, 2018

Lesson From The Tax Court: When Non-Receipt Of An IRS Notice Matters

Tax Court (2017)In 2015, Congress added what is commonly called the “Taxpayer Bill of Rights” to the Tax Code.  Currently codified in §7803(a)(3), it lays upon the IRS Commissioner the duty to ensure that IRS employees “are familiar with and act in accord with taxpayer rights as afforded by other provisions of this title.”  Section 7803(a)(3) then lists 10 (natch!) rights including “the right to be informed” and “the right to appeal a decision of the Internal Revenue Service in an independent forum.”  I wonder whether the person who drafted that last quoted language, or any of the folks who reviewed it, discussed whether it makes any grammatical sense for one to “appeal...in” a forum?  

Putting aside the grammatical question, readers might well question the impact of these rights on IRS operations.  The recent case of Paul T. Venable, II v. Commissioner, T. C. Memo. 2018-144 (Sept. 10, 2018), suggests an answer for the two rights I quoted above: the right to be informed and the right to appeal an IRS decision to an independent forum.  It teaches a lesson about the rare situation where the lack of actual receipt of an IRS notice can be important to a taxpayer’s ability to get judicial review of an IRS decision.  But the lesson does not come from the language in §7803(a)(3).  Nope, the lesson comes from language in “other provisions” in the Code, notably the CDP provisions in §6330(c).

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October 1, 2018 in Bryan Camp, New Cases, Scholarship, Tax, Tax Practice And Procedure | Permalink | Comments (1)

Monday, September 24, 2018

Lesson From The Tax Court: The Substantial Substantiation Rules In §170

Tax Court (2017)The great philosopher George Carlin understands the problem of stuff.  My wife and I have too much stuff.  My wife, however, hates yard sales.  And we cannot afford a bigger house.  So we give a lot of stuff away. 

When Congress ratcheted up the substantiation requirements for deducting non-cash charitable contributions in 1993, we stopped giving to Goodwill.  That is because Goodwill did not change their pre-printed receipt form to say the now-required magic language “no goods or services were given in exchange for this donation.”  While some of our donations were below the $250 threshold, the aggregate value of our donations of similar items regularly exceeded that amount.  I remember one year I had to go up several layers of management to even get a letter with that language sent to me before I could file my taxes.  So we now favor other charities.

I was not just being picky in wanting a proper contemporaneous receipt, as the recent case of Estelle C. Grainger v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2018-117 (July 30, 2018) demonstrates.  The taxpayer there was massively confused about the basic valuation rules for donations of property.  That’s one lesson here.  But I think another important lesson in this case is just how difficult the substantiation rules in §170 can be for substantial amounts of non-cash charitable contributions.  It was certainly an eye-opener for me, particularly the lesson about Form 8283.

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September 24, 2018 in Bryan Camp, New Cases, Scholarship, Tax, Tax Practice And Procedure | Permalink | Comments (10)

Monday, September 17, 2018

Lesson From The Tax Court: Distinguishing Property Settlement From (Indirect) Alimony

Tax Court (2017)Congress eliminated the deduction for alimony in the December 2017 Reconciliation Act (informally called the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act).  But the legislation grandfathered in alimony payments made pursuant to divorce or separation instruments executed on or before December 31, 2018. The question of whether a payment qualifies as alimony will thus still be important for many taxpayers for years to come.  The short lesson from the recent decision in Jeremy Adam Vanderhal v. Commissioner, T.C. Sum. Op. 2018-41 (Sept. 5, 2018) is thus worth blogging about.  Plus, it's nice to blog about one of those very rare wins for a pro se taxpayer.

This is mainly a drafting lesson: the tax effect of language in a divorce or separation instrument turns on what the language does more than what the language says it does. Here, Judge Carluzzo gives a very nice lesson on how not to be distracted by what the language says it is doing.

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September 17, 2018 in Bryan Camp, New Cases, Scholarship, Tax | Permalink | Comments (2)

Monday, September 10, 2018

Lesson From The Tax Court: No Stopping The Perpetual Debate About Conservation Easements

Tax Court (2017)The recent case of Harbor Lofts Associates, Crowninshield Corporation, Tax Matters Partner v. Commissioner, 151 T.C. No. 3 (Aug. 27, 2018) teaches yet another lesson on the importance of the perpetuity requirements when claiming a charitable deduction for the donation of a conservation easement. Last October I blogged about another conservation easement case, Palmolive Building Investors v. Commissioner, 149 T.C. No. 18 (Oct. 10, 2017). I did not get into the substance of the law in that blog, but instead focused on the Golsen rule and why the Tax Court needed to put its best analytical foot forward. I referred readers to Peter Reilly’s great blog post on Palmolive for the substance.

I encourage readers who don't know the Golsen rule to review the Golsen post, because Harbor Lofts is a case that the taxpayers may appeal to the First Circuit Court of Appeals. That is important because it’s the First Circuit who disagreed with the Tax Court’s position regarding the subordination requirement at issue in Palmolive. While today’s case involves a different part of the perpetuity requirement (and so there is no First Circuit precedent to bind the Tax Court), the Tax Court is again agreeing with the IRS in reading the perpetuity requirement strictly, this time finding that a long-term lease is not sufficient to meet the perpetuity requirements. If the Tax Court’s opinion is appealed to the First Circuit, the First Circuit may decide to take the same liberal interpretation of the perpetuity requirement as it did in Kaufman v. Shulman, 687 F.3d 21 (1st Cir. 2012), the case that was like Palmolive.

Today’s post will therefore comment on the Tax Court’s approach to interpreting the perpetuity requirements for conservation easements.  Long story short, I agree with it.  The First Circuit’s liberal approach, while understandable, is wrong.  This post will explain why. To do so, I will have to dip into the substantive law with the caveat, as always, that what I say is subject to correction from alert readers who know this area better than I do.  In particular, I will doubtless expose my ignorance by asking why the taxpayers did not structure the donation differently.  It was likely for a reason that I just cannot see.  The fun starts below the fold. 

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September 10, 2018 in Bryan Camp, New Cases, Scholarship, Tax, Tax Practice And Procedure | Permalink | Comments (1)

Tuesday, September 4, 2018

Lesson From The Tax Court: The Common Law Of Tax

Tax Court (2017)I tell my students you can often see how a court opinion will go by the opening line.  In the recent case of Pacific Management Group, BSC Leasing, Inc., Tax Matters Partner, Et. al v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2018-131 (Aug. 20, 2018), the first sentence signals that the opinion will not end well for the taxpayers.  In that sentence Judge Lauber calls their carefully calibrated ballet-like choreographed set of structured transactions a “scheme.”  Darn.

Explaining why this scheme did not work took Judge Lauber over 80 pages.  And while blogging all the intricacies of the case is too much for one post, I do see one lesson in the case that I think you will find worth your time, a lesson about the common law of tax. 

We often get so caught up in the intricacies of the various statutory provisions in the Internal Revenue Code that we lose sight of the fact that the U.S. legal system is based on a powerful idea: judges have the power to say what the law is and are not limited to the textual sources of law found in statutes and regulations.  The traditional name for the kind of law not found in legislative pronouncements is “common law.”  Judges write down their interpretations and understandings of the common law in opinions that later judges can consult.  We call that precedent. 

The common law tradition in the U.S. legal system influences even such a highly complex statutory and regulatory area of law as tax.  In this case, Judge Lauber applied various common law doctrines to supplement and inform the relevant statutory provisions: the economic substance doctrine; the reasonable compensation doctrine; and the assignment of income doctrine.  Again, it would be too much to cover all of these.  So I will discuss only one: the common law of assignment of labor income.  It’s an appropriate lesson for this Labor Day morning.

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September 4, 2018 in Bryan Camp, Scholarship, Tax | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, August 27, 2018

Lesson From The Tax Court: The Misunderstood Trust Fund Recovery Penalty

Tax Court (2017)A recent Tax Court case teaches a lesson about the §6672 Trust Fund Recovery Penalty (TFRP), and about the proper scope of a Collection Due Process hearing.  In Kathy Bletsas v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2018-128 (Aug. 14, 2018), the IRS found Ms. Bletsas to be a responsible person who willfully failed to turn over trust fund taxes.  So the IRS assessed a §6672 penalty against her and filed a Notice of Federal Tax Lien (NFTL) to encumber all her property and rights to property.  Ms. Bletsas asked for and received a Collection Due Process (CDP) hearing about the NFTL. 

Represented by the indefatigable Frank Agostino (and by Malinda Sederquist), she argued that the collection decision to file an NFTL was an abuse of discretion because the IRS was getting steadily paid through an Installment Agreement (IA) with the employer and so did not need to file the NFTL against the Ms. Bletsas.  And, hey, she wasn’t really a responsible person anyway!

Trust fund taxes?  Responsible person?  TFRP?  To learn what that’s all about and what lesson Judge Lauber teaches, read on.  No one would blame you, however, if you instead clicked over to YouTube to watch this old Johnny Carson clip with Robin Williams and Jonathan Winters...

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August 27, 2018 in Bryan Camp, New Cases, Tax | Permalink | Comments (2)

Monday, August 20, 2018

Lesson From The Tax Court: No Relief For Miscalculating ACA Premiums

Tax Court (2017)A pair of cases over the past few weeks teach a lesson about the Affordable Care Act (ACA) premium assistance tax credit calculations.  The cases are Terry Jay Grant and Twila Rose Grant v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2018-119 (Aug.1, 2018) and Luis Palafox and Hilda Arellano v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2018-124 (Aug. 7, 2018).

Readers are no doubt aware that the ACA (a/k/a Obamacare) requires all individuals to purchase health insurance, requires all health insurance plans to contain certain provisions, and subsidizes the purchase of health insurance via a tax credit mechanism.  At the federal government level, the ACA splits up regulatory duties between HHS and the IRS.  HHS regulates stuff like the content of health plans, the establishment of the health exchanges and eligibility requirements, reimbursement policies, and procedures.  The IRS regulates the collection of taxes Congress enacted to fund the law, including the “shared responsibility payment” owed by taxpayers who fail to purchase health insurance (which, as Justice Roberts explained to a surprised readership, is a “tax” for constitutional purposes but not a “tax” for statutory purposes).  But there are several provisions that require significant coordination between the two agencies.

The health care premium subsidies Congress put in the Tax Code are one such provision.  To help certain individuals afford the mandatory health insurance coverage, Congress chose to subsidize the cost of insurance with federal funds.  Congress chose a tax credit as the mechanism to implement the subsidy.  Located in §36B it is there called the Premium Assistance Credit, but is commonly called the Premium Tax Credit (abbreviated PTC).  Certain taxpayers can choose to take the credit as an advance, commonly called the Advance Premium Tax Credit (APTC).   The APTC is paid directly to the insurance provider and not to the individual taxpayers.  

This subsidy structure creates two problems.  First is an awkward timing problem because taxpayers must guesstimate their eligibility for the subsidy and then true-up over a year later when they file their tax returns.  Second is a communication problem because the federal monies are paid directly to the insurance provider who must then properly communicate the amounts to the taxpayers so the taxpayers can do the true-up.

The two cases teach a lesson about the timing problem and the harsh consequences for messing up the guesstimate.

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August 20, 2018 in Bryan Camp, New Cases, Tax | Permalink | Comments (3)

Wednesday, August 15, 2018

Camp: Equitable Principles And Jurisdictional Time Periods

Bryan Camp (Texas Tech), Equitable Principles and Jurisdictional Time Periods, Part 2, 159 Tax Notes 1581 (June 11, 2018):

This is the second of two articles looking at the relationship of equitable doctrines and time limits in the Tax Code. In the first article, I showed how courts apply a mythical rule that equitable principles cannot apply to jurisdictional time limits. I showed why this rule is in fact a myth and argued that both normatively and empirically, the question of whether equitable principles can be applied to a given time period is a different question than whether the time period is “jurisdictional.”

This article addresses a different aspect of how equitable doctrines affect a jurisdictional time period in tax law. When one studies the case law, one finds many instances where the Tax Court—often blessed by the Courts of Appeals—laments that it may not equitably “enlarge” or “extend” jurisdictional time periods, but then accomplishes the same result through its discretionary fact-finding power. In effect, it cheats. Less dramatically, it creates fictions to cover the gap between what is and what ought to be. While denying the power to use equitable principals to modify the legal bed, it instead uses equitable principles to stretch or lop off facts to fit a procrustean conception of the relevant limitation period.

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August 15, 2018 in Bryan Camp, Scholarship, Tax | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, August 13, 2018

Classic Lesson From The Tax Court: When Hornung Won The 'Vette

PaulHornung1961ToppsCardI'm back from vacation, but busy preparing for the start of classes, so I offer another Classic Lesson that I have been saving.  I hope you enjoy it.  I will return next week with a new Lesson based on a recent case.

I find tax more interesting than football.  But I know I am not like most people.  So I enjoy using the classic case of Hornung v. Commissioner, 47 T.C. 428 (1967), because it not only teaches students a bit about football history, it also helps them understand a really important tax concept: the doctrine of constructive receipt. As a bonus, it is also one of those fun cases where the taxpayer and the IRS take the opposite of their normal positions, with amusing consequences.

Paul Hornung was an outstanding football player in the 1960’s, winning a bunch of very well known awards: the Heisman Trophy, the NFL MVP award, and induction into both the professional and college football halls of fame.  Here's a Sports Illustrated tribute to him.

Hornung also won a Corvette on December 31, 1961, when his team (the Green Bay Packers) beat the New York Giants for the National Football League Championship. Remember, at that time the NFL was the main football league so this was, basically, the Super Bowl. The AFL was only just starting and it was several years before the first designated “Super Bowl” game occurred between the leagues.

Hornung was selected by Sport Magazine as the game’s most valuable player. That selection came with an award: a brand-spanking new 1962 Corvette. The award was announced in Green Bay at the conclusion of the game in the late afternoon of Sunday, December 31, 1961. The car was in Manhattan. Hornung picked up the car the next week at a lunch given in his honor by the magazine. He sold the car a few months later for just over $3,000.  He did not report any income from receiving the Corvette, either in 1961 or in 1962.  When the IRS audited his 1962 return, he claimed that if receipt of the Corvette was income, it was income in 1961, not 1962, under the doctrine of constructive receipt.  To see how that worked out for him, you will need to dive below the fold.

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August 13, 2018 in Bryan Camp, Celebrity Tax Lore, Tax | Permalink | Comments (2)

Monday, August 6, 2018

Classic Lesson From The Tax Court: The Ole December 31st Check Problem

Tax Court (2017)'m on vacation this week but I wrote up this Classic Lesson before I left so you could have something to chew on as you drink your morning beverage of choice.

Timing is at least as important in tax as it is in comedy. Although less common than it used to be before the age of direct deposit and mobile banking apps, the question sometimes arises about when must a taxpayer report as gross income a check received on December 31st but not cashed until January. The flip side is when may a taxpayer take a deduction for a check sent out on December 31st but not cashed until January.

Taxpayers tend to want to push off reporting income into a later year and tend to want to pull back deductions into the current year. Specifically taxpayers who receive a check on the last day of the year would like to say they don’t have income until they cash the check in January. But at the same time, taxpayers who write a check for a deductible expense on the last day of the year want to deduct that expense in that year and not the next.

Taxpayers cannot have it both ways. The good news is that the IRS has long allowed checks mailed on December 31st to be deductible in the year mailed, even when not cashed until January, so long as the taxpayer has truly parted control over the delivery of the check. See Treas.Reg. 1.170A-1(b).

The bad news is that taxpayers are also generally required to report checks received on December 31st as income. The rationale for that, however, is not entirely clear, as one sees in the classic case of Kahler v. Commissioner, 18 T.C. 31 (1952).

 

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August 6, 2018 in Bryan Camp, New Cases, Tax | Permalink | Comments (4)

Monday, July 30, 2018

Lesson From The Tax Court: The Power Of The Form 872 Waiver

Tax Court (2017)This past week I learned a lesson about partnership tax returns from the case of Inman Partners, RCB Investments, LLC, Tax Matters Partner, v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2018-114 (July 23, 2018).  Partnership taxation is definitely out of my comfort zone, so I am quite grateful for the help of my colleagues on the double-super-secret-tax-profs-rule-the-world listserv that Paul Caron started back in 1995, shortly after the internet got its graphical interface.  They got me straight on some terminology and sent me off reading some cool stuff.  Still, readers may well spot error, and if you do, please give a correction in the comments.  I am especially hesitant when I think I spot an error in a Tax Court opinion as I did here.  I know full well the error could be mine.

Inman is a case where the partners, but not the partnership, had signed a Form 872 waiver for their 2000 tax year.  The IRS issued a FPAA to Inman Partners.  Inman petitioned the Tax Court and it’s argument was a procedural one: the FPAA was too late because it was issued more than three years after the due date of the Partnership Return.  In response the IRS said “Hey, we got these here waivers!”  Inman said: “those were just signed by the individual partners and were not signed by the partnership and so they cannot waive the limitation period for the FPAA against the Partnership.”   

Judge Holmes held that the language in the Form 872 was strong enough to also waive the limitation on assessment for the related partnership for an earlier tax period.  It might be, however, that the language worked only because of the statutory scheme then in place for partnership audits.  Congress nuked that scheme in the December 2017 tax reform legislation.  Does Inman give us any insights on whether the Form 872 language still works?  For a quick swim through the murky waters of partnership procedure, I invite you to dive below the fold. 

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July 30, 2018 in Bryan Camp, New Cases, Tax, Tax Practice And Procedure | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, July 23, 2018

Lesson From The Tax Court: Origin Of The Claim Test For §162

Tax Court (2017)Last week’s post involved taxpayers whose tax troubles arose from events related to the Great Recession. Those troubles resulted in litigation and a lesson about how the Tax Court applies an “origin of the claim” test in evaluating claimed §104(a)(2) exclusions.

This week’s post also involves a taxpayer whose life took a downturn during the Great Recession. Only this week we look at the more traditional application of the “origin of the claim” test when taxpayers seek to deduct litigation expenses. In Sky M. Lucas v. Commissioner, T.C. Mem.o 2018-80 (June 11, 2018) the IRS sent Mr. Lucas an NOD asserting a tax deficiency of $1.7 million for 2010. Part of that deficiency was due to the disallowance of about $3 million in legal and professional fees related to Mr. Lucas’ divorce litigation.  The multi-year litigation was a fight over some $47 million.  No wonder it was expensive. In the end, Mr. Lucas got to keep most of that.  Mr. Lucas thought he could deduct his litigation costs.  For a great lesson in how the Tax Court applied the origin of the claim test to deny him the deduction, see below the fold.

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July 23, 2018 in Bryan Camp, New Cases, Tax | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, July 16, 2018

Lesson From The Tax Court: An 'Origin of the Claim' Test For §104(a)(2) Exclusions

Tax Court (2017)Here at Texas Tech we require all law students to take the basic course in federal income tax. That is not because we are especially cruel, but rather because tax law touches so many other areas of practice that the faculty believes every student should have an introduction to tax. I must shape my course knowing that at least two thirds of the students do not want to become tax lawyers. One tack I take is to highlight tax issues that regularly come up in other practice areas such as family law and litigation.

A case from the Tax Court last week teaches a useful lesson about the intersection of tax with litigation practice.  Jacques L. French and Sherry L. French v. Commissioner, T.C. Summary Op. 2018-36 (July 12, 2018) involves taxpayers seeking to exclude a settlement payment under §104(a)(2), the section that allows taxpayers to exclude from gross income the amount of damages received because of personal physical injury or physical illness.

We usually think about the “origin of the claim” test in the §162 context, where courts use it to decide when taxpayers may deduct expenses associated with litigation. In fact, just this last week I saw another Tax Court opinion that involves this application of the origin of the claim test. I may blog that next week, unless something else catches my eye.

This week, however, I think it is useful to see how the Tax Court takes a very similar approach to deciding when a taxpayer can exclude a damage award under §104(a)(2). In both situations, it is the nature of the claim asserted in litigation that governs the potential exclusion or the potential deduction.  Looking at §104(a)(2) also allows me to give a shout out to the Tax Court's newest Special Trial Judge, Diana L. Leyden.  Her carefully constructed opinion shows us exactly how the Tax Court applies this “origin of the claim test” in the §104(a)(2) context. It makes for a nice lesson from the Tax Court.

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July 16, 2018 in Bryan Camp, New Cases, Tax | Permalink | Comments (0)

Tuesday, July 10, 2018

Wax Does Not Wane

A colleague of mine here at Tech Law, Dwight McDonald, only recently found out about the Amy Wax controversy at U. Penn. when he read this editorial by Walter Williams, a professor at George Mason Law School. It was published in our local paper on July 4th.  Dwight was inspired to write a response in a letter to our paper.

In his editorial, Mr. Williams supports Ms. Wax’s claims and says: “The fact that black students have low class rankings at such high-powered law schools as Penn doesn't mean that they are stupid or uneducable. It means that they've been admitted to schools where they are in over their heads."

In Dwight's pithy response, he points out some weaknesses in Williams' claims, and also a curious contradiction among some of those who take Mr. William’s position.  You can read it below the fold.

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July 10, 2018 in Bryan Camp, Legal Education, News | Permalink | Comments (13)

Monday, July 9, 2018

Lesson From The Tax Court: Naked Assessments!

Tax Court (2017)The Notice of Deficiency (NOD) is almost always clothed with a presumption of correctness. Some might say “cloaked” or “shrouded” are a better terms because what the presumption does is shield all that happened prior to the NOD from judicial scrutiny. Courts will generally not go behind the NOD to examine how the IRS came up with its numbers unless and until the taxpayer gives the court a good reason to disbelieve the NOD (or successfully invokes §7491(a), the provision that shifts the burden of production from the taxpayer to the IRS).

It is easy to apply the presumption of correctness in situations where the NOD is simply denying deductions or exclusions. That is because the taxpayer already bears the burden of proving an entitlement to deductions and exclusions. So if the taxpayer cannot come up with the proof, then too bad, so sad.

It is more difficult to apply the presumption in situations where the NOD asserts that the taxpayer failed to report gross income. In that situation, the IRS must have some basis for the assertion of omitted income. That is, the presumption of correctness does not allow the IRS to just make up numbers. In the seminal case of United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976), the Supreme Court said that “where the assessment is shown to be naked and without any foundation” then the burden shifts to the IRS to show facts that link the taxpayer to the alleged omitted income. I really love the delightfully mixed metaphor the Fifth Circuit used in Carson v. Commissioner, 560 F.2d 693, 696 (5th Cir. 1977): "The tax collector's presumption of correctness has a herculean muscularity of Goliath-like reach, but we strike an Achilles' heel when we find no muscles, no tendons, no ligaments of fact."

Two recent Tax Court cases teach a lesson on what “ligaments of fact” suffice to prevent an NOD from being “naked and without any foundation.” In both of these omitted income cases, the IRS was able to produce enough facts to get back the presumption, but in very different ways. The cases are: Gerald Nelson v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2018-95 (June 28, 2018); and Mohammad Najafpir v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2018-103 (July 3, 2018).

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July 9, 2018 in Bryan Camp, New Cases, Tax, Tax Practice And Procedure | Permalink | Comments (2)

Monday, July 2, 2018

Lesson From The Tax Court: The One Return Rule

Tax Court (2017)Sometimes I get irritated. When I do I speak in short sentences. Really short. So when I read Judge Buch’s opinion in the recent case of Gary Gaskin and Jessie Gaskin v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2018-89 (June 20, 2018), I was struck by his frequent use of short sentences. Really short. Kinda like he was really irritated. And why wouldn’t he be? Mr. Gaskin had filed admittedly fraudulent tax returns but now wanted to contest the fraud penalties! Mr. Gaskin thought he should escape fraud penalties because he had later filed amended returns that had, in his view, cured the fraud.  Judge Buch's opinion teaches an important lesson we should all learn. I call it the “one return rule.” It’s a short lesson. You will find it below the fold.

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July 2, 2018 in Bryan Camp, New Cases, Tax, Tax Practice And Procedure | Permalink | Comments (2)

Monday, June 25, 2018

Lesson From The Tax Court: Into The Weeds on COGS

MrMoneyMedicalMarijuanaWCap1I avoid inventory accounting in my basic tax class. It is taxing enough (pun intended) to teach students the basics of depreciating business equipment and business realty and the interplay of §167, §179, §168(k) and §168(a) (in that order). I remind them that they are learning to be tax lawyers and not tax accountants: if they cannot do the numbers, hire a CPA. So I only mention cost of goods sold (COGS) concepts in passing. Also, I’m pretty clueless about the subject.

In real life, however, inventory accounting can be crucial, and you had better have good representation when the IRS questions your numbers. That is the lesson I see in the recent case of Laurel Alterman and William A. Gibson v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2018-83 (June 13, 2018), a case involving poor representation of a medical marijuana business. Disclaimer: not only do I not teach COGS but I also never practiced it, so if you dive below the fold, you may catch me out in error. I know for some readers that is actually an incentive to read on---kind of like waiting for a crash on the racetrack. But if you find yourself guffawing at something, please do not hesitate to publicize the error in the comments section. And remember, at least I’m not representing anyone!

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June 25, 2018 in Bryan Camp, New Cases, Tax | Permalink | Comments (13)

Monday, June 18, 2018

Lesson From The Tax Court: Where Is A Retiree's Tax Home?

Tax Court (2017)The last couple of weeks have seen Tax Court cases with several interesting lessons. The one I choose today is Roger G. Maki and Lilane J. Gervais v. Commissioner, T.C. Summary Op. 2018-30 (June 6, 2018). It teaches a lesson about what constitutes travel “away from home” for purposes of the §162 deduction. I posted a basic lesson (here) on this issue late last year. The wrinkle in today’s case is that the taxpayer was retired and traveled from his home in the Seattle metro area to a house he had inherited, ostensibly to manage the surrounding land for eventual timber sales. The Tax Court decided the travel was deductible. I question whether that’s the right outcome here — it seems to me this was just a commute — but notice this is just a Summary Opinion. That means it can still teach a lesson, even if it carries no precedential weight.

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June 18, 2018 in Bryan Camp, New Cases, Tax | Permalink | Comments (4)

Monday, June 11, 2018

Lesson From The Tax Court: What Makes Tax Law Complex

Tax Court (2017)Tax reminds me of the children’s poem that starts “I have a little shadow.” Tax is the shadow (sometimes not so little) that follows all of us throughout life. Put another way, every activity in life throws a tax shadow. And life is not simple. I submit that much of tax complexity is a reflection of life’s complexity, including people’s relationships with one another. And we all know how relationships can get complicated. Last week’s case of Joseph Engesser v. Commissioner, TC Summary Opinion 2018-29 (June 4, 2018), not only illustrates this idea, but it also shows how certain parts of the Tax Code’s complexity hits lower income taxpayers particularly hard. They must deal with one of the gnarliest tax issues in the Code: §152, the section that defines who is a dependent.

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June 11, 2018 in Bryan Camp, New Cases, Tax | Permalink | Comments (6)

Monday, June 4, 2018

Lesson From The Tax Court: A Haunting

Tax Court (2017)Four cases from the last couple of weeks illustrate the continued fallout from the Tax Court’s recent about-face in its reading of §6751(b)(1). Graev v. Commissioner, 149 T.C. No. 23 (Dec. 20, 2017)(commonly called Graev III because it was the Tax Court’s third published opinion regarding Mr. Graev’s case). The good folks at Procedurally Taxing have been following Graev III’s impact here, here and here (to name a few). These four cases add a new wrinkle.

In all four cases, the Service had failed to produce evidence in the initial trial that it had complied with §6751(b)(1). And for good reason. All four cases had gone to trial before the Court issued its opinion in Graev III. At the time of trial the Tax Court’s fully reviewed position on §6751(b)(1) was that consideration of penalty approval was premature when contesting an NOD.

In all four cases the Service asked the Tax Court to re-open the record to allow it to introduce the theretofore-unrequired-but-now-required evidence. The cases were heard by three different Tax Court judges. In two cases, the Court allowed the record to be reopened and in two cases the Court refused. Taken together, the cases illustrate how the fallout from the Tax Court’s Graev decision continues to elevate procedure over substance. As a result, similarly situated taxpayers receive very different outcomes based both on which IRS attorneys work the cases, what information the attorneys have, perhaps most importantly, which Tax Court judge decides. Four cases, three judges, two opposing outcomes, all in one discussion, waiting for you below the fold.

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June 4, 2018 in Bryan Camp, New Cases, Tax, Tax Practice And Procedure | Permalink | Comments (1)

Who Are The Tax Professors?

The 4th Annual Texas Tax Faculty Workshop at Texas Tech on June 1st went splendidly with robust discussion fueled by plenty of caffeine and carbs.  I thought it would be fun to post a picture of the 11 of us when ended up being able to attend.  After all, tax profs are usually just names on a page.  But we are persons too!  Here's proof.  From left to right are: Bret Wells (UH); Bryan Camp (Texas Tech); Denney Wright (UH and NYU); Andy Morris (A&M); Bruce McGovern (South Texas); Cal Johnson (UT); Terri Helge (A&M) standing behind Dennis Drapkin (SMU); Bill Byrnes (A&M)(giving thumbs up); Steve Black (Texas Tech) standing behind Jack Manhire (A&M).

TT

June 4, 2018 in Bryan Camp, Conferences, Scholarship, Tax, Tax Profs | Permalink | Comments (2)

Friday, June 1, 2018

Fourth Annual Texas Tax Faculty Workshop Today At Texas Tech

Texas Tech Logo (2016)A baker's dozen tax professors are gathering in Lubbock, Texas, at Texas Tech University School of Law today for the fourth annual Texas Tax Faculty Workshop.   Susan Morse (UT) started the gatherings---you guessed it---four years ago.  Here is the agenda for this year:

Session #1: Paper from Terri Helge (A&M) (tax exempt orgs)
Lead Commentators:  Dennis Drapkin (SMU), Alyson Outenreath (TTU)

Session 2: Paper from Jack Manhire (A&M) (tax compliance)
Lead Commentator: Steve Black (TTU)

Session #3: Paper from Brett Wells (UH) (§355)
Lead Commentators:  Bruce McGovern (South Texas), Mark Cochran (St. Mary's)

Session #4: Open Discussion of Current Projects

Session #5: Paper from Cal Johnson (UT) (tax and economics)
Lead Commentator:  William Byrnes

Session #6: Paper from Andy Morriss (A&M) (English tax rule)
Lead Commentator: Jack Manhire (A&M)

For abstracts of each paper, see below the fold.

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June 1, 2018 in Bryan Camp, Conferences, Scholarship, Tax, Tax Profs | Permalink | Comments (0)

Tuesday, May 29, 2018

Lesson From The Tax Court: A Tax Truism

Tax Court (2017)A truism is a saying that is so commonly accepted as true that it needs no further explanation.  For example: "never get involved in a land war in Asia.”  Today’s lesson shows us a tax truism: never take tax advice from the person selling you the deal.  In RB-1 Investment Partners, Eric Reinhart, Tax Matters Partner v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2018-64 (May 14, 2018), the taxpayer received millions of dollars from the sale of a business and invested in a complex transaction that the promoter promised would magically wipe away the gain with no actual economic loss (except fees).  When the taxpayer got caught, it conceded the merits, but attempted to avoid imposition of a 40% penalty under §6662 by arguing reasonable reliance on an opinion letter from the law firm promoting the scheme. I explain below the fold the taxpayer’s argument, why it failed, and what we can learn.

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May 29, 2018 in Bryan Camp, New Cases, Tax | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, May 21, 2018

Lesson From The Tax Court: The Role Of State Law In Federal Taxation

Tax Court (2017)The United States Legal system is as hard to learn as the English language. One of the more difficult aspects of the system is the existence and interplay of 51 sovereignties. The Tax Code is not immune from that difficulty. Even though federal tax is governed in the first instance by federal law, state law can still be quite important to the resolution of a federal tax controversy, whether the dispute is about the amount of tax owed or the collection of an undisputed amount. The recent case of Vincent C. Hamilton and Stephanie Hamilton v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2018-62 (May 8, 2018) teaches a lesson about the role of state law in determining a federal tax liability.

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May 21, 2018 in Bryan Camp, New Cases, Tax | Permalink | Comments (1)

Monday, May 14, 2018

Lesson From The Tax Court: The Reach Of Equity

Tax Court (2017)Justice Holmes famously said that people “must turn square corners when they deal with the government.” It is no coincidence that he said that in this 1920 tax case. Tax law has many sharp corners that frustrate both taxpayers and the IRS alike. For an example of where the sharp corners of procedure caused the IRS to lose a $10 million assessment, see Philadelphia-Reading Corp. v. Beck, 676 F.2d 1159 (3rd Cir. 1982).

But equity can sand down some of those sharp corners. Last week's post looked at the innocent spouse case of the Commie L. Minton a.k.a. Connie L. Keeney v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2018-15 (Feb. 5, 2018). That case illustrated how Congress had inserted a statutory command for the IRS and the Tax Court to use equity to relieve a spouse of an otherwise jointly owed liability. This week, the case of Emery Celli Cuti Brinckerhoff & Abady, P.C. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2018-55 (Apr. 24, 2018), teaches another lesson about equity in the Tax Law. Here, there is no Congressional command to use equity. Instead, the Tax Court uses a long-standing principle of equity created and apply by the courts. It is called equitable recoupment.

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May 14, 2018 in Bryan Camp, New Cases, Tax, Tax Practice And Procedure | Permalink | Comments (1)

Monday, May 7, 2018

Lesson From The Tax Court: The Role Of Equity

Tax Court (2017)For various reasons that legal historians can drone on about for hours, the United States legal system started out in 1789 as not one system of courts but two systems of courts. One was system was made up of courts of law, staffed by folks with titles like “Judge” or “Justice.”  The other system was made up of courts of equity, staffed by folks with titles like “Chancellor” or “Vice Chancellor.”  The basic idea was that each system had its own set of powers and you could only get to the equity courts if the law courts lacked the power to give you the relief you sought.

This was a really awkward relationship and a constant source of embarrassment and confusion.  The great legal historian F. W. Maitland put it this way in his 1910 Lectures On Equity:  “I do not think that any one has expounded or ever will expound equity as a single, consistent system, an articulate body of law.  It is a collection of appendixes between which there is no very close connection.”  (p. 19)  And in this 1913 law review article, Professor Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld discussed the difficulty of teaching equity as a system of rules separate from legal rules.

One awkwardness was that often the same individual would wear both hats.  For example, you might file an action at law and have proceedings before the “Judge” sitting as a court of law.  The Judge had power to award damages but did not have power to order depositions.  So you would need to file a completely separate proceeding in equity, seeking a “Bill of Discovery” from the Vice Chancellor because the Vice Chancellor had the power to order depositions (but had no power to award damages).  But you would file that in the same building and be heard by the same individual. So one day the “Judge” would say “I have no power to order discovery” but the next day the very same individual, sitting as “Vice Chancellor,” would suddenly have the power to grant your Bill.

I tell you all this because although the two systems have been merged in federal courts since 1938 (although some states, such as Delaware and Mississippi, keep the two systems separate) federal judges still tend to compartmentalize the two.  The Tax Court in particular has wrestled with the role of equity from its inception.  Two recent Tax Court cases teach useful lessons about the role of equity in Tax Court proceedings.  This week I will look at the innocent spouse case of the Connie L. Minton a.k.a. Connie L. Keeney v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2018-15 (Feb. 5, 2018).  Next week I will discuss the very interesting case of Emery Celli Cuti Brinckerhoff & Abady, P.C. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 2018-55 (Apr. 24, 2018), a case that will introduce us to the doctrine of equitable recoupment.

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May 7, 2018 in Bryan Camp, New Cases, Tax, Tax Practice And Procedure | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, April 30, 2018

Lesson From The Tax Court: The Cohan Doctrine Cannot Always Save You

Tax Court (2017)One of the first clients I had after graduating from law school in 1987 was a fellow in the construction business. I forget what dispute brought him to us, but I will never forget the “records” he brought: a truckload of paper bags. Turns out that each year he would set a paper grocery bag on the floor and, as the year went by, he would dump anything he thought important into the grocery bag ... if he remembered to do so. You can guess who got to go through all his paper bags.

I am sure many of you have encountered clients with similar, if not more pathetic, record-keeping practices. Readers well know that taxpayers bear the burden of production to show why they are entitled to claimed deductions. To do that they need to keep good records.

If taxpayers don’t keep good records, however, they can sometimes get lucky under what is commonly called the Cohan doctrine. For those interested, my blog here explains the doctrine and its history.  Basically, the doctrine says that if the taxpayer can prove the fact of an expense, but not the exact amount of the expense, the Tax Court will make its own estimate of the amount, “bearing heavily if it chooses upon the taxpayer whose inexactitude is of his own making.” Cohan v. Commissioner, 39 F.2d 540, 544 (2d Cir. 1930).

Two weeks ago I blogged here about a taxpayer who got lucky when the Tax Court judge spotted an issue that both the taxpayer’s attorneys and the IRS attorneys had overlooked, saving the taxpayer some $42,000 in taxes.  This week we look at a case, Stanislav Antoniev Dimitrov v. Commissioner, T.C. Summary Opinion 2018-21, that teaches a lesson about the limits to getting lucky under the Cohan doctrine.

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April 30, 2018 in Bryan Camp, New Cases, Tax | Permalink | Comments (1)

Monday, April 23, 2018

Lesson From The Tax Court: It's Still An Adversarial Process

Tax Court (2017)Several features of the Tax Court make it a unique institution in U.S. law.  For example, no other court has (or needs) the Golsen rule. Here’s a post where I explain why.  And no other federal court uses the Tax Court’s quasi-en banc process. Kandyce Korotky over at Procedurally Taxing has a nice post here describing how that process sometimes produces opinions where more judges join the concurrence than the opinion of the Court.

But the Tax Court still hews to that greatest feature of the U.S. legal tradition: the adversarial process, where each side takes responsibility for presenting its own case and the Court simply judges between the cases presented. That is the lesson I see in last week’s decision in Aaron Keith Nicholson v. Commissioner, T.C. Summary Opinion 2018-24 where the taxpayer was representing himself and the IRS was represented by not one but FIVE attorneys of record. Really. I think the case should have been a lesson about the hobby loss rules, but it turns into a lesson that tax litigation rests on an adversarial process where the parties’ concessions, no matter how lame they appear, will bind them.   This is true even in the small case procedure. Here, it benefitted the taxpayer.

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April 23, 2018 in Bryan Camp, New Cases, Tax | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, April 16, 2018

Lesson From The Tax Court: Better Lucky Than Good

Tax Court (2017)Most of us who are either preparing our returns last week (or today), or reviewing the returns prepared for us, honestly want to get it right. We try to be good. But just as life is complex, so is the tax shadow created by life activities and decisions. Last week’s decision in Stacey S. Marks v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2018-49, is not so much a lesson about being good as it is a lesson that sometimes—just sometimes—you can get lucky.

Details below the fold.

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April 16, 2018 in Bryan Camp, New Cases, Tax | Permalink | Comments (8)

Monday, April 9, 2018

Lesson From The Tax Court: One Year At A Time

Tax Court (2017)

Last week the Tax Court issued 19 opinions, including one articulate opinion on Collection Due Process that teaches an interesting, albeit esoteric, lesson about the bulk-processing nature of tax administration.  I will save that case, Scott T. Blackburn, v. Commissioner, 150 T.C. No. 9, for another week, or perhaps our colleagues over at Procedurally Taxing will blog it.

In today’s post I want to look at two of last week’s opinions that I think teach a more basic lesson about the important way in which each tax year is separate from all others.  The two cases are: (1) Shane Havener and Amy E. Costa v. Commissioner, T.C. Sum. Op. 2018-17 (Apr. 4, 2018); and (2) Gary K. Sherman and Gwendolyn L. Sherman v. Commissioner, T.C. Sum. Op. 2018-15 (Apr. 2, 2018). 

Notice that both of these are what are called “Summary” Opinions.  That means the taxpayer in each one elected the small case procedures allowed by IRC §7463 and implemented by Tax Court Rules 170 et. seq.  As most readers no doubt know, the upside of that election is relaxed procedural rules (notably rules of evidence) and the downside is that the loser may not appeal to a higher court.  The idea is that these are cases where the dispute between the taxpayer and the IRS is really one about factual matters and not about the law. That is why when you access these cases through the Tax Court website, the website pops up the following message in all-caps: “Pursuant To Internal Revenue Code Section 7463(b), This Opinion May Not Be Treated As Precedent For Any Other Case.” 

The very reason why these cases make for lousy precedent, however, is why they often make for good lessons about basic tax concepts.  The lesson I see in these two cases is about the appropriate accounting period, a particularly timely lesson this week since April 16th (the deadline for filing returns this year since April 15th falls on a Sunday) is right around the proverbial corner. 

To economists, the most accurate accounting period is one’s lifetime.  That is, the best measure of income is what happens over our lifetime.  But because governments need revenue sooner, because not all taxpayers die (think corporations), and because even if tax revenue would even out in the long, long, long run, the transition costs to a lifetime accounting period would be untenable, Congress created a yearly accounting period for income tax (and shorter accounting periods for excise taxes such as the employment tax). 

That yearly period ends on December 31st for most of us mere mortals.  The yearly questions we ask are “how much income did I have during the last year?” and “what expenditures did I make that I can deduct from the income I made?”  The point of today's lesson is that we must ask those questions every year and just because we get a wrong answer in one year does not entitle us to continue using that wrong answer in later years. 

More below the fold.

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April 9, 2018 in Bryan Camp, New Cases, Tax, Tax Practice And Procedure | Permalink | Comments (4)

Monday, April 2, 2018

Classic Lesson From The Tax Court: Twitty Burgers!

TwittyBurgerMenuThe Tax Court issued no opinions last week, likely because it was holding its Judicial Conference at Northwestern School of Law in Chicago. Our colleagues over at Procedurally Taxing attended and blogged about it here. Les Book reports (here) that the last session of the Conference was looking forward to the future of the Tax Court.

Future, Schmoocher. My love of history keeps my head buried firmly in the sands of the past. For not only is the past prologue, it’s also epilogue. That’s the lesson I take away from this Tax Court classic: Harold Jenkins v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1983-667, a case I teach as an epilogue to the Supreme Court's classic Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111 (1933).The Jenkins case deserves your attention not only because of its lesson about the difference between business and personal deductions but also because of the poetry (?) it inspired both from Tax Court Judge Leo H. Irwin and from the IRS Office  of Chief Counsel 

All that, and more, below the fold.

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April 2, 2018 in Bryan Camp, Celebrity Tax Lore, Miscellaneous, Tax | Permalink | Comments (7)

Monday, March 26, 2018

Lesson From The Tax Court: Why Labor Is Not Deductible, Or, Love’s Labor Lost

Tax Court (2017)I mow my own lawn. Most of the other houses in my neighborhood pay a lawn service to do that. But I’m too cheap to pay someone $40 to do what I can do perfectly well. To some economists, my act of mowing my own lawn is income to me. As the great economist Benjamin Franklin might say, the $40 saved is $40 earned. Thank goodness I do not have to count that imputed income as gross income!

The point is that my labor may have a market value. I could go into the lawn care business and others would pay. But until I actually get paid, how do you know whether my labor is worth $40 or $35 or $45? And when I labor instead at my desk at Tech Law, my labor is rewarded with a decent salary. But does the fact that I get paid for my labor mean that when I perform labor above and beyond—such as writing this blog post for example—such uncompensated labor is an expense? Have I “incurred” an expense that, if performed in the carrying on of my trade or business, is deductible under §162? That is the question posed by the case of James Edward Bradley Jr. and Margaret Letitia Hayes-Hunter v. Commissioner, T.C. Summary Op. 2018-13 (Mar. 19, 2018). There, Judge Panuthos teaches a seemingly simple lesson: a taxpayer may not deduct the value of the uncompensated labor they put into their business. Unpaid labor is not deductible.  Underneath this seeming simplicity, however, lies some interesting complexities.

More below the fold.

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March 26, 2018 in Bryan Camp, New Cases, Tax | Permalink | Comments (2)

Monday, March 19, 2018

Lesson From The Tax Court: The Turbo-Tax Defense

Turbo TaxDespite the adage “ignorance of the law is no excuse,” the Tax Court issued an opinion last week suggesting that sometimes ignorance of the tax law can indeed be an excuse, at least to escape the §6662 accuracy-related penalties.   In Karl F. Simonsen and Christina M. Simonsen v. Commissioner, 150 T.C. No. 8 (Mar. 14, 2018), the Tax Court held that a California couple who messed up the tax treatment of a short sale of their former residence were not liable for accuracy-related penalties. Judge Mark “I’m No Caligula” Holmes wrote for the Court. The actual basis for the holding was that the IRS “failed to meet [its] burden of production on the accuracy-related penalty” because it did not introduce any evidence of compliance per the Tax Court’s newly discovered reading of §6751(b)(1). Our colleagues over at Procedurally Taxing have been following the §6751 issue for some time. If you are interested, here’s a good post by Professor T. Keith Fogg to start you out.

But immediately after throwing out the penalty for the IRS’s failure to produce the required evidence, Judge Holmes wrote four pages of dicta about how even if the IRS had met its burden, the taxpayers here acted with “reasonable cause and in good faith” within the meaning of the exculpatory language of §6664(c)(1). Why did he spend so much time doing this? Because he wanted the world to know that “we will not penalize taxpayers for mistakes of law in a complicated subject area that lacks clear guidance.” And one of the factors that went into the “good faith” conclusion was that Mrs. Simonsen not only consistently used TurboTax for over 11 years to prepare the couple’s returns, but had to upgrade to “a CD-ROM version of TurboTax instead of the usual online version because she needed a special form...to properly report the...income.” That caused my colleague Gregg Polsky to email me with this query: “So this case means that taxpayers that follow Turbo Tax to a completely illogical result are immune from penalties?”

Well, maybe...but then again remember this is just dicta. And while the Tax Court is correct that tax is a “complicated subject area” I do not think it was correct in finding that the taxpayers here had no “clear guidance.” But reasonable minds may disagree.

Along with the penalty lesson, this case teaches a nice lesson on the tax treatment of a short sale of property encumbered with a non-recourse loan.  I’ll run through that first because it may help us understand why the Tax Court here was willing to let ignorance of the law be a defense to accuracy-related penalties.

Details below the fold.

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March 19, 2018 in Bryan Camp, New Cases, Tax | Permalink | Comments (9)

Monday, March 12, 2018

Lesson From The Tax Court: The Common Law Of Tax

Tax Court (2017)When I go abroad and introduce U.S. law and legal systems to lawyers from civil law countries, they are generally surprised that U.S. judges have so much power. They rightly perceive that the “common law” is really a license of power to judges, a power that is only broadly constrained by other government actors. This power allocation to the judicial branch is, however, an essential part of the U.S. political system, a system designed to resist a corrosive and corrupting concentration of power into any one person or small group of people. Our system carves up power both horizontally—think legislative v. executive v. judicial—and vertically—think state v. federal.

Our law schools inculcate the common law tradition into our students starting in the first year. In fact, despite nods to leg/reg courses, the first year curriculum is still mostly about the common law.  And the Socratic method is, in large measure, a method that works to establish common law thinking methods in our students, notably in how it forces students to pay attention to facts. Facts matter in the common law. We teach them to matter to students. And some of those students eventually become Tax Court judges.

We tax lawyers tend to forget the great common law tradition that undergirds the U.S. legal system. After all, we work from that Bodacious Compendium of rules in the Internal Revenue Code and associated regulations. But even in such a textually bounded area of law as tax, the common law persists. For example, the tax question about “who” must pay tax on an item of income is largely common law, even when it intertwines with various tax statutes, notably the grantor trust rules in §671 et seq. When I teach assignment of income, I tell my students to leave their statutory supplements at home.  We're in common law country. 

The importance of common law to tax is the lesson I draw from the Tax Court’s opinion last week in the consolidated cases of Celia Mazzei v. Commissioner and Angelo L, and Mary E. Mazzei v. Commissioner, 150 T.C. No. 7 (March 5, 2018). The taxpayers in these cases played around with various entity structures to try and avoid the contribution limits to their Roth IRAs. The IRS caught them out. The Tax Court sustained the IRS NOD and the Judges wrote three opinions totaling 104 pages. The majority, in an opinion by Judge Thornton (joined by 11 others) uses common law rules developed in the assignment of income area to sustain the IRS’s Notice of Deficiency. Judges Paris and Pugh, who joined the majority, also pen a concurring opinion that emphasizes the common law question (and are joined by three of the others who also joined the majority). Judge Holmes (joined by three others) dissents, believing that the relevant tax statutes trump the common law.

The clash of opinions are good reading, not only for their very satisfying lesson about the role of common law in our system of taxation but also because they really do clash: Judge Holmes basically accuses the majority of channeling the Emperor Caligula and Judge Thornton labels some of Judge Holmes’s claims “bizarre.”

Details below the fold.

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March 12, 2018 in Bryan Camp, Legal Education, New Cases, Tax | Permalink | Comments (10)

Monday, March 5, 2018

Lesson From The Tax Court: The Tax Lawyer's Wedding Toast

During the first week of teaching federal income tax I give a homework assignment where I ask students to compare the 2011 tax returns of Mitt Romney and Hillary Clinton. Students must decide who had the heavier tax burden. You can find these returns (and many more) on the Tax Analyst Tax History website. Here’s what we usually come up with in class:

  Total Income Taxable Income Tax     % of Total Inc. % of Taxable Inc.
Romney $13,709,608  $9,007,709  $1,912,529 14%    21%
Clinton $14,899,139  $11,628,845  $4,336,068 29%    37%

My students are surprised by this result. Although they had similar total incomes, Romney and Clinton paid hugely different amounts and percentages of taxes no matter how you measure tax burden. But there is nothing nefarious about it. It simply reflects Congressional choice to tax capital gains at a lower rate than ordinary income.

To get the lower tax rate the gain must come from a sale or exchange of something called a “capital asset” that has been held for more than one year. Romney’s income came mostly from sales or exchanges of capital assets while Clinton’s came mostly from her labor. That difference in source made the difference in tax. Whatever one thinks about Clinton’s speaking fees, they still resulted from her labor and so were taxed at significantly higher rates than Romney’s capital gain income, even though dollars derived from labor have the same purchasing power as dollars derived from capital.

This preferential tax treatment for capital gains over labor income is a subsidy whereby Congress shifts dollars from one set of taxpayers (those like Clinton) to another set of taxpayers (those like Romney). It’s a subsidy just like the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) except that the EITC shifts dollars from higher earning taxpayers to lower earning taxpayers. So who does Uncle Sugar love more? Why, folks like Romney!! In 2016 the federal government spent about $106 billion to subsidize taxpayers who, like Romney, received income from capital sales or exchanges. In comparison, it spent $63 billion on the EITC subsidy. You can see these figures in the JCT’s latest Estimates of Federal Tax Expenditures.

Congress does put some restrictions on this rate subsidy. For example, §1211 generally prevents taxpayers from deducting capital losses against ordinary income.  After all, if a gain from the sale or exchange of a capital asset gets a lower rate, then a resulting loss should not be able to shelter otherwise higher taxed gain but only similarly taxed gains.

So when taxpayers have gain from the sale of some kind of property held for more than one year, they really want that lower tax rate. They want their gains to be from the sale of a capital asset. Contrariwise, when taxpayers have losses from the sale of some kind of property, taxpayers would really like to deduct those losses from their ordinary income, the kind that gets taxed at a higher rate. They want those losses to be from the same of property that is not a capital asset.

So what the heck is a “capital asset”? That is the lesson in Sugar Land Ranch Development, LLC, Sugar Land Advisors, LLC, Tax Matters Partner v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 2018-21 (February 22, 2018). There, the taxpayers were able to transform properties that did not qualify as capital assets before 2008 into properties that did qualify as capital assets when they sold the properties for a net gain in 2012. So they got the rate subsidy. How’d they do that? Details below the fold, along with the Tax Lawyer’s Wedding Toast.

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March 5, 2018 in Bryan Camp, New Cases, Tax | Permalink | Comments (2)

Monday, February 26, 2018

Lesson From The Tax Court: Underwater Debtors

Tax Court (2017)Last week’s lesson was about the tax consequences to the borrower when the lender cancels the debt. This week’s case looks at the other side of the transaction to teach a lesson about what constitutes debt. Section 166 allows a lender who gives up trying to get back borrowed money to deduct the bad debt, effectively treating current income as a return of the lost capital. Similarly, a lender who sells debt to a third party for less than basis can calculate a loss under §1001 and may be able to treat that loss as a long-term capital loss.

But to have either a bad debt under §166 or a loss under §1001, there must be a “debt” in the first place. That is the lesson from last week’s case of Michael J. Burke and Jane S. Burke v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2018-18. There, the taxpayer attempted to take both long-term and short-term capital losses in 2010 and 2011 through a mix of §166 deductions and claimed capital losses from sale of debt at less than basis. The alleged bad debts arose in connection with a scuba diving business in Belize. On audit, the IRS disallowed the deductions, creating a deficiency in taxes totaling some $444,000. The dispute was whether the Burkes had “debt” to lose. Judge Holmes’ opinion does a deep dive into the meaning of “debt” and shows why the taxpayer’s arguments here were all wet. If you think I’ve gone overboard in my water metaphors, Judge Holmes’ opinion is drenched with them. Makes for a splashy opinion.

More below the fold.

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February 26, 2018 in Bryan Camp, New Cases, Tax, Tax Practice And Procedure | Permalink | Comments (0)

Sunday, February 25, 2018

NY Times Op-Ed: The Misguided Drive To Measure 'Learning Outcomes'

Here at Texas Tech University School of Law we are gearing up for our ABA site inspection.  In the past few years the ABA has required law schools to create "Learning Outcomes."  Here's the language from Section 3.02:

A law school shall establish learning outcomes that shall, at a minimum, include competency in the following:
(a) Knowledge and understanding of substantive and procedural law;
(b) Legal analysis and reasoning, legal research, problem-solving, and written and oral communication in the legal context;
(c) Exercise of proper professional and ethical responsibilities to clients and the legal system; and
(d) Other professional skills needed for competent and ethical participation as a member of the legal profession.

This is the first year that the site teams will be evaluating a law school's compliance with the new standard.  We knew it was coming and I have been on a committee for the past three years that has been trying to translate this standard into operation. While I believe we have done a good job with it, I also believe the standard to be of questionable value. 

I read with pleasure this New York Times op-ed by Molly Worthen, The Misguided Drive to Measure 'Learning Outcomes'.  I especially like its concluding line:  "[T]here's just no app for that." 

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February 25, 2018 in Bryan Camp, Legal Education, Teaching | Permalink | Comments (7)

Monday, February 19, 2018

Lesson From The Tax Court: The Phantom Of The Tax Code—Discharge Of Indebtedness

Tax Court (2017)The Tax Court issued two opinions on January 16, 2018, where taxpayers got hit by what I call the Phantom of the Tax Code: Discharge of Indebtedness (DOI), also known as Cancellation of Debt (COD). I will first tell you about each case, and then discuss what we can learn about this Phantom.

In John Anthony Glennon v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2018-4, Mr. Glennon got unlucky in Las Vegas, but not in the usual way. He was at the airport and was enticed by the offer of a $59 fly-anywhere ticket to sign up for a Southwest Airlines credit card issued by Chase Bank. Like most of us, he just wanted the enticement and after using it planned to cancel the card. But times got bad and he needed the card to pay living expenses. He fell behind in payments and in 2014 the bank contacted him with an offer to settle the debt. He took the offer, and his payment left him with a balance due of just under $9,686. The bank then cancelled that remaining debt and in 2015 sent him a Form 1099-C. Mr. Glennon did not report the COD income and thanks to its nifty computer matching system, the IRS discovered the resulting deficiency in tax. Mr. Glennon’s main argument before the Court seems to be that “the debt had been resolved by his settlement.” The Court responded: “petitioner did not understand the concept of cancellation of indebtedness income.”

In Michelle Keel v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2018-5, Ms. Keel’s 2015 COD income kicked her over the income limit to receive health insurance premium assistance tax credits. Those credits are given to taxpayers on a monthly basis in the form of direct payments to insurers to help pay for the taxpayer’s health insurance. Their purpose is to help with cash flow problems. In Ms. Keel’s case, she claimed the credit for 2015 and the federal government paid $335 per month to her insurer.

Only taxpayers whose income falls below a ceiling can get the health insurance premium assistance credits. And while taxpayers are allowed to estimate their income for the year, they must reconcile the amount of credits received with their actual income. In 2015 the ceiling for Ms. Keel was $46,680. In 2015 Ms. Keel had wage income of $39,000 and if that were her only income, she would qualify. However, in 2015 the Bank of America discharged some $16,000 of indebtedness. If you add that to the wage income, it took her well above the ceiling. While Ms. Keel properly reported the COD income on her return, she failed to reconcile. The IRS did it for her and Ms. Keel protested the resulting NOD. She asserted in her petition that the COD should not count in computing her eligibility for the premium assistance tax credits. But she failed to otherwise appear or argue the matter.  The Tax Court granted Summary Judgement to the IRS.

Each cases teaches us something about the Phantom of the Tax Code: a basic lesson and a more advanced one. Both lessons are below the Fold

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February 19, 2018 in Bryan Camp, New Cases, Tax | Permalink | Comments (2)

Friday, February 16, 2018

Tenure Report Haiku

This is the time of year when tenure decisions get finalized at most institutions. Usually, law faculty vote their recommendations in the Fall semester and then the tenure packages work their way through the various levels of review. Final approval by the relevant governing body happens sooner or later during the Spring Semester, depending on how bulbously bureaucratic the institution is. It will likely happen here at Texas Tech later rather than sooner.

Here at Tech Law the law faculty recommended promotion and tenure for seven professors last fall, a record number. I was chair of the tenure committee for one of them, my colleague Robert Sherwin.

Rob’s a pretty amazing guy. In addition to serving as the Director of Tech Law’s Advocacy Programs, Rob personally coaches anywhere between six to ten advocacy teams a year. And he teaches doctrinal courses. And he is creating a serious body of scholarship on litigation subjects.

It’s the scholarship part that I want to focus on for just a paragraph. I am not sure that his scholarship would be fully appreciated at some institutions because it is heavily doctrinal. You can see for yourself at his SSRN page. But here at Tech Law we take a big-tent approach to scholarship and doctrinal is all right by us. Rob writes to help courts or legislatures solve problems in the law. That is a worthy enterprise. And one of Rob’s articles, a careful exploration of problematic language in anti-SLAPP legislation, led the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws to select him as Reporter of the Drafting Committee on the Anti-SLAPP Legislation Act. Few of us academics get this kind of opportunity to have such a direct effect on law. The Tech Law faculty are quite proud of Rob for this.  Other faculties may not share that appreciation. They have a much narrower vision of what it means to be a legal scholar.  

So Rob’s tenure decision was never really in doubt. In fact, in writing Rob’s Tenure Report, each of the three members of his tenure committee vied with each other to see who could use the most superlative superlative to describe Rob’s teaching, scholarship, and service. This was the winner: “if contemporary moot court had a Nick Saban (the University of Alabama’s wildly successful football coach), it would be Rob Sherwin.”

When it came time for the faculty meeting, I was given the last slot to present Rob’s tenure report. That’s kinda like going 30th in the Giant Slalom. After the other six candidates were presented to the faculty, I decided enough was enough. So in lieu of the usual, I offered to summarize our report to the faculty in one of three forms: a haiku, a doggerel, or a limerick. Being the sophisticated faculty they are, my colleagues asked for the haiku.

It’s below the fold. 

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February 16, 2018 in Bryan Camp, Legal Education, Scholarship | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, February 12, 2018

Lesson From The Tax Court: Arguments Are Not Evidence

Tax Court (2017)One common error my students make is to confuse asserting an argument with supporting the argument. For example, a student on my Civil Procedure exam might write “We will argue that the Plaintiff’s domicile is in Texas and not Oklahoma.” That sentence tells me only that an argument exists. It does not support the argument with an explanation about why Plaintiff’s domicile might be thought to be in Texas. I try to teach my students they must connect assertions with the evidence necessary to show why the assertions are true. So I feel like a failure when I read exam answers like that. I think most profs have similar feelings when grading.

Lawyers sometimes make a similar error when representing clients in court: they make assertions and even spin a plausible story, but neglect to support those assertions or the story with credible evidence. To be fair, sometimes an attorney has no choice: the client may simply not have provided the needed information, and the attorney must nonetheless argue something! But arguments are not evidence.

Last week’s decision in Brandon Brown and Christi Cloaninger Brown v. Commissioner, T.C. Sum. Op. 2018-6 (Feb. 5, 2018), teaches this lesson. Sure, it’s “just” an S case, but even if those cases are not formal precedent, they can still teach valuable lessons. Here, the case is also a nice illustration of when it makes sense to use the §7463 Small Case procedures and how the burden shift in §7491(a) can sometimes actually be important.

I’ll consider each lesson below the fold.

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February 12, 2018 in Bryan Camp, New Cases, Tax, Tax Practice And Procedure | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, February 5, 2018

Lesson From The Tax Court: Forms Follow Function In Return Filing

Montana Road SignLaw is often a mixture of form and function.  Formalist rules help create order and certainty but sometimes do so at the expense of justice and meaning.  Discerning and following the function or purpose of the law may create juster outcomes but sometimes does so at the expense of certainty.  All can agree that there is a time and a place for each mode of analysis, but the devil is in the details. 

The speed limit sign to the right illustrates the difference.  It's a sign you might have encountered driving through Montana up until 1999 when the Montana Supreme Court ruled that the "reasonable & prudent" rule was unconstitutionally vague.  It gives two rules for drivers:  a bright-line night rule that you may not drive faster than 65 mph and a fuzzy day rule that gives no set speed limit but just says you may not drive unreasonably or imprudently. 

In applying the speed limit sign, formalists and functionalist might disagree on when the night rule applies. A formalist might look to the dictionary definition of night as the period between sunset and sunrise and so apply the night rule at the minute after sunset. But a functionalist might say that the purpose of the night rule is to set a limit when night-time conditions make it presumptively unsafe to drive faster. So a functionalist might not apply the night rule until later after sunset, and might also apply it during the “day” when a weather event, such as a haboob or an eclipse, creates sufficiently night-like conditions. Of course, formalist thinkers might disagree among themselves if they use different dictionary definitions of “night."  Likewise, functionalist thinkers might disagree among themselves if they have different ideas about the purpose of the night rule.

Last week’s reviewed opinion Melissa Coffey Hulett a.k.a. Melissa Coffey, et al v. Commissioner, 150 T.C. No. 4 (January 20th, 2018) is a case where the Tax Court takes a largely functional approach to IRC §6501(a) statute of limitations on assessment and yet the functionalists on the Court disagree with each other about the proper outcome.  Section 6501(a) says that the IRS has a period of three years “after the return was filed” to assess “any tax imposed by this title.” The opinion for the Court, authored by Judge Holmes, is a mix of formalism and functionalism, using the passive voice in the statutory language as an opening to implement one important purpose of §6501: closure. A concurring opinion by Judge Thornton gives a more robustly functionalist view, resting entirely on the closure purpose of the statute.  And a spirited dissent, authored by Chief Judge Marvel, also presents a functionalist analysis but one that focuses on a different purpose of the statute to come to a different outcome in the case.

What I find particularly interesting about this case is how all three approaches seem to be inconsistent with the Tax Court’s approach to interpreting the §6501(c) exception to §6501(a)’s general three year rule. That statute presents a similar question of statutory interpretation but all of the opinions in last week’s case are contrary to the Tax Court’s rationale in Allen v. Commissioner, 128 T.C. 37 (2007).

Details below the fold.

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February 5, 2018 in Bryan Camp, New Cases, Tax, Tax Practice And Procedure | Permalink | Comments (1)

Monday, January 29, 2018

Lesson From The Tax Court: Country Music Ain't All Business

Tax Court (2017)Country music teaches us lots of tax lessons. Here’s a list of country music songs about taxes. I especially like Johnny Cash’s lesson about the difference between gross pay and net pay in  “After Tax”:

You can dream about a honeymoon for two
You can dream but that's about all you can do
'Cause by the time old uncle Sam gets through with you
You can buy her a pair of hose
A little powder for her nose
And take her down to Sloppy Joe's for beer and stew
Them are the facts after tax

The folks who sing country music also teach us many lessons about basic principles of taxation. One day I’ll blog the classic Jenkins v. Commissioner. Today, however, I draw your attention to last week’s Joy Ford v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2018-8 (Jan. 25, 2018). Its lesson fits well with standard country music themes about love and broken dreams, about making money and making friends.  Details below the fold. 

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January 29, 2018 in Bryan Camp, New Cases, Tax | Permalink | Comments (4)

Monday, January 22, 2018

Lesson From The Tax Court: Treasury Regulations And The APA

Tax Court (2017)No doubt there is a lot of dirty bathwater in the Treasury Regulations, codified in title 26 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR). The upside of the current administration’s anti-regulation focus is that it is allows Treasury to prioritize scrubbing unneeded regulations. Treasury reported on its progress in October noting that “the IRS Office of Chief Counsel has already identified over 200 regulations for potential revocation, most of which have been outstanding for many years.”

To be sure, it’s a small upside. Some regulations become outdated because they are simply overtaken by statutory changes. For example, Treas. Reg. 1.217-2(b)(1) allows taxpayers to deduct the cost of meals when moving to start a new job. That was fine under the statute Congress originally enacted in 1969, but it became obsolete when Congress modified the statute in 1986 to specifically disallow meal expenses as a deductible item. And now, of course, Congress has repealed the moving expense deduction entirely, but the regulations will still be there.

Other regulations become outdated because of societal change. My favorite example is former Treas. Reg. 1.162-6 which started off this way: “A professional man may claim as deductions the cost of supplies used by him....” To modern eyes, that regulation obviously denied deductions to taxpayers not in the trade or business of being a “professional man” ...such as anyone who was only a man as a hobby and not as profession. Think Victor, Victoria. Treasury nuked that reg in 2011.

The scrubbing effort carries a small upside because outdated regulations generally do little harm. I tell my students that is why you have to read the actual statutory language first. In real life, of course, tax practitioners rely on the commercial services like BNA, CCH or RIA to summarize the rules and those services keep current. Taxpayers reporting their 2017 taxes are unlikely be blindsided by the moving regulations into trying to deduct meal expenses in a move. Likewise, taxpayers reporting their 2018 taxes are unlikely to try and deduct moving expenses at all, much less in reliance on the regulations.

But the focus on throwing out the bathwater presents an obvious danger to the baby. The ham-fisted 2-for-1 requirement of Executive Order 13711 is not just focused, it’s myopic. Another danger is posed by the myopic thinking that the word “regulation” has the same meaning for all agencies and that the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) applies in lock-step to all agencies. Both myopias ignore the vast difference in purpose of regulations issued by different agencies.

Last week’s Tax Court opinion in SIH Partners LLLP, et al. v. Commissioner, 150 T.C. No. 3, January nicely illustrates the purpose and use of tax regulations. In it, the taxpayer tried to invalidate a 45 year old regulation for failing to meet APA requirements. The Tax Court has a nice opinion applying the APA with sensitivity to the tax regulation process and suggests a clearer view of what makes tax regulations different from those of many other agencies.

More below the fold.

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January 22, 2018 in Bryan Camp, IRS News, New Cases, Tax, Tax Practice And Procedure | Permalink | Comments (2)

Friday, January 19, 2018

The Effect Of A Government Shutdown On The IRS: Not What You Think

Machines are cheap. Humans are expensive. The IRS depends upon both to administer the fiendishly complex tax code that Congress tirelessly re-scrambles every year. This year is, of course, much, much worse. And everyone seems at least aware that a government shutdown will hurt the IRS’s ability to implement the new law. Here’s a recent WaPo article on the subject.

But the effect of a government shutdown on IRS operations is worse than is being reported.  More below the fold.

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January 19, 2018 in Bryan Camp, IRS News, Miscellaneous, News, Tax, Tax Policy in the Trump Administration | Permalink | Comments (6)

Monday, January 15, 2018

Lesson From The Tax Court: What Are They Thinking?

Tax Court (2017)I tell my students to be careful with personal pronouns, especially now that the pronoun “they” may properly refer to a singular antecedent. An unclear antecedent can confuse readers.

Today I may have confused you. When you read this post's title, you may have thought “they” refers to “Tax Court.” Maybe you thought this would be a critique of a Tax Court opinion like last week’s post. It’s not. Sorry.

The “they” in the title is deliberately ambiguous, however, because it points to two different antecedents, neither being the Tax Court. First, it points to three taxpayers whose cases were decided last week by the Tax Court. Each case has at least one fact that is so amazing it will leaving you shaking your head (or "SMH" in modern texting parlance) and asking yourself “what were they thinking.”

Second, “they” means Congress. For the past 8 years Congress has adopted a policy of “starving the beast” and forcing the IRS to reduce its workforce. I wrote about that a couple of years ago here. These cases teach us why that Congressional policy is a thoughtless one. 

Each of these three cases shows an educated middle-class taxpayer trying to game the tax system in ways that require significant human resources to combat. In two cases it took human IRS employees to spot the games and defeat them. In the third case, the taxpayer is “winning” his game, at least temporarily, thanks to the Collection Due Process provisions. It will likely take significant additional human effort to collect this taxpayer’s unpaid tax liabilities.

More below the fold.

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January 15, 2018 in Bryan Camp, New Cases, Tax, Tax Practice And Procedure | Permalink | Comments (3)

Monday, January 8, 2018

Lesson From The Tax Court: Reporting Income v. Reporting Information

Tax Court (2017)My daughter worked part-time this past year for a woman who paid her about $500 cash. My daughter was not happy to learn from me that she has to report that as gross income. My daughter says “but my employer is not giving me a W-2 or 1099!” I am sure many of us have heard that from clients. Last week, the Tax Court issued an opinion that may give unintended support for my daughter’s assertion that there is no obligation to report income unless there is a concomitant obligation to file a related information return.

In 2010 Congress enacted the Hiring Incentives to Restore Employment Act (HIRE), 124 Stat. 71. Subtitle A of HIRE (§501 et. seq.) implemented what had been a separate bill called the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA). FATCA requires many individuals to report their foreign financial assets under certain circumstances. Violation of the reporting requirements carries several consequences, including monetary penalties and an extension of the limitation period for the IRS to audit a return. That’s the issue in last week’s case of Mehrdad Rafizadeh v. Commissioner, 150 T.C. No. 1 (January 2, 2018). In Rafizadeh, the IRS seemed to try and use that latter consequence to crack open otherwise closed years. At least that is what the Tax Court appears to believe. The sticking point was that the years at issue were years before the FATCA reporting requirements took effect. See below the fold for why the IRS thought that the FATCA provisions extending the limitation period applied, and why the Tax Court held otherwise.

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January 8, 2018 in Bryan Camp, New Cases, Tax Practice And Procedure | Permalink | Comments (1)

Friday, December 22, 2017

The Farmer, The Pickup, And The Elephant: A Post-Modern Fable

Once upon a time in West Texas there lived a farmer. In addition to raising crops, he kept a collection of interesting animals as a hobby. Always keen to make some money, however, he used the output of the animals for compost and sold the excess to surrounding farms. More about that below the fold. But first I need to tell you about the farmer’s pickup truck, “Iris.”

The farmer’s dad had bought a fine Ford F250 in the early 2000’s. His dad was very fond of the truck and called it “Iris.” But the farmer did not like Iris and so he used it exclusively to haul the animal product to market. Of course that meant Iris stank. The stink offended people, who thought Iris was to blame for payload the farmer asked Iris to carry.

When the farmer took over farming operations from his dad in 2008 he began neglecting Iris by not putting in the money to make needed upkeep and repairs. For example, he used a really cheap motor oil because he liked its name “Liberty,” and he liked the pennies he saved. But that oil actually did the exact opposite of what oils are supposed to do: it exacerbated the wear on the engine Then the farmer started using an even cheaper lubricant: chicken grease. When the once proud 5.2L Voodoo V8 engine failed, the farmer replaced it with an 4-cylinder engine taken from a Ford Fiesta, ‘cause that was cheap. More pennies saved! As parts failed, Iris became increasingly unreliable.  Still, the farmer kept relying on Iris to carry the load for him.

And now, for the Elephant part, below the fold.

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December 22, 2017 in Bryan Camp, IRS News, Tax, Tax Policy in the Trump Administration, Tax Practice And Procedure | Permalink | Comments (3)

Thursday, December 14, 2017

WaPo: How The IRS Values Art

I try to tell my students that where the rubber hits the road for many tax issues is in valuation.  Here's a great story about one aspect of valuation disputes from the Washington Post Magazine:  "The Secretive Panel of Art Experts That Tell the IRS How Much Art is Worth"

Each year, bequests and donations of art generate tens of millions of dollars in potential tax revenue. But to be accurately taxed, an artwork needs to be accurately valued, and the owner who has to pay the tax can’t be expected to provide the last word. When an artwork is sold outright, the Internal Revenue Service needs no help in determining how much to tax; it has the purchase price and the sale price and it knows how to subtract. (The maximum federal tax rate on profits from the sale of art and collectibles is 28 percent, higher than the 15 to 20 percent for stocks.) Things get trickier, however, when an artwork passes to an heir or is given to a museum. The agency still needs to know, as of the date of death or donation, how much the art is worth, but without a current sale price that figure can be debatable.

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December 14, 2017 in Bryan Camp, IRS News, Tax | Permalink | Comments (1)