Tuesday, January 23, 2018
Peter Dietsch (University of Montreal, Department of Philosophy) presents Tax Competition and Global Background Justice (with Thomas Rixen (University of Bamberg, Department of Political Science)) at NYU today as part of its Tax Policy Colloquium Series hosted by Lily Batchelder and Daniel Shaviro:
Competition for mobile tax bases undermines the fiscal self-determination of states and exacerbates inequalities of income and wealth both within countries and globally. The paper provides a normative evaluation of international tax competition, and puts forward two principles of international taxation designed to both protect and circumscribe the fiscal self-determination of states. First, a membership principle, which holds that deriving the benefits of membership in any given country grounds an obligation to pay one’s taxes there. Second, a constraint on fiscal policy, ruling out fiscal arrangements that can be shown both to be based on strategic intent and to have a collectively negative outcome.
We call for the establishment of an International Tax Organization (ITO) to implement these principles of global background justice in taxation.