Tuesday, March 4, 2014
James R. Hines, Jr. (Michigan) & Kyle D. Logue (Michigan) present Delegating Tax at NYU today as part of its Tax Policy Colloquium Series hosted by Daniel Shaviro and Alan Auerbach:
Congress delegates extensive and growing lawmaking authority to federal administrative agencies in areas other than taxation, but tightly limits the scope of IRS and Treasury regulatory discretion in the tax area, specifically not permitting these agencies to select or adjust tax rates. This Article questions why tax policy does and should differ from other policy areas in this respect, noting some of the potential policy benefits of delegation. Greater delegation of tax lawmaking authority would permit policies to benefit from the expertise of administrative agencies, and afford timely adjustment to changing economic circumstances. Furthermore, delegation of the tax reform process to an independent commission or agency offers the prospect of Congress commiting itself to rational reform and long-run budget sustainability in a way that is more apt to succeed than are piecemeal legislative efforts. The Article concludes with an analysis of the constitutionality of tax delegation, noting the applicability of recent Supreme Court interpretations that Congress has broad discretion to delegate rulemaking authority to federal agencies, and that tax policy is of a kind with other federal policies.