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Editor: Paul L. Caron, Dean
Pepperdine University School of Law

Wednesday, November 7, 2012

Perkins Presents Salience and Sin: Designing Taxes in the New Sin Era at Washington U.

HolmesRachelle Holmes Perkins (George Mason) presented Salience and Sin: Designing Taxes in the New Sin Era at Washington University as part of its Tax Colloquium Series hosted by Adam Rosenzweig:

Tax salience reflects the extent to which consumers take into account the after-tax cost of a good or service prior to making their consumption decision. Recent empirical work on tax salience has revealed something that is perhaps intuitive, but nevertheless important to the design of sin taxes. Taxpayers are more likely to make consumption decisions based on pre-tax rather than post-tax prices when the salience, or visibility, of a tax is diminished. Thus, consumers are less likely to change their demand for a particular product if shelf prices are tax-exclusive rather than tax-inclusive. Economically, this makes low salience taxes mimic some of the benefits of taxes on inelastically demanded goods. Because a taxpayer’s demand change in response to a tax price increase is diminished, the deadweight loss generated by the imposition of the tax can be reduced. Notwithstanding the potential for efficiency gains, politicians and academics alike have expressed various fairness, distributional, and normative concerns regarding the use of low salience taxes. A number of countries already require tax-inclusive pricing for consumer products in order to purportedly preserve consumer awareness and transparency.

I argue that lawmakers should be able to exploit the benefits of low salience taxes. To the extent they are able to minimize economic distortions the concerns that have been expressed are not fatal. The appropriate use of a low salience design for any particular sin tax is dependent on a number of factors, including the price elasticity of demand, the potential for countervailing income effects, and whether the tax is intended to raise revenue or modify taxpayer behavior. I find that while selectively implemented low salience taxes can be beneficial, as a normative matter, I do not believe they should be universally implemented in sin tax design. In fact, in certain situations I argue that lawmakers will best benefit from more salient taxes. I propose that these taxes may have efficiency benefits when lawmakers are seeking to influence taxpayer behavior. Ultimately, while it is difficult to draw definitive conclusions regarding the optimal use of tax salience given that many empirical and theoretical aspects of salience have yet to be developed, the empirical work done to-date suggests that the impact of tax salience on tax design may be significant and is worth exploring.

Colloquia, Scholarship, Tax | Permalink

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