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Tuesday, January 11, 2011

Hickman: Goodbye National Muffler!  Hello Administrative Law?

Hickman Kristin Hickman (Minnesota), Goodbye National Muffler!  Hello Administrative Law?:

With today’s opinion in Mayo Foundation for Medical Education & Research v. United States, No. 09-837 (Jan. 11, 2011), the Supreme Court has finally and decisively rejected the notion of tax exceptionalism in judicial review standards.  For years now, the tax community has debated whether Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), or National Muffler Dealers Ass’n, Inc. v. United States, 440 U.S. 472 (1979), provides the appropriate standard of review for evaluating Treasury regulations issued under the general authority of I.R.C. § 7805(a).  The question before the Court in Mayo was the substantive validity of Treas. Reg. § 31.3121(b)(10)-2, a general authority Treasury regulation. Unlike previous tax cases before the Court, briefing by the parties and by dueling amici in Mayo clearly raised and thoroughly addressed the question of Chevron versus National Muffler review.  In upholding the regulation, the Court clearly and unequivocally chose Chevron and rejected National Muffler as the standard of review for general authority Treasury regulations.

In deciding the case, the Court first concluded that Code § 3121(b)(1) is ambiguous; had it found the statute to be clear on its face, the Court would not have had to resolve the question of Chevron versus National Muffler.  The Court went on to resolve that issue with the following observations and conclusions:

  • the Chevron and National Muffler standards “call for different analyses of an ambiguous statute”;
  • National Muffler factors such as the agency’s inconsistency or the interpretation’s longevity or contemporaneity (or lack thereof) are not reasons for denying Chevron deference to a Treasury regulation;
  • whether litigation prompts a regulation is likewise “immaterial” to the question of Chevron-eligibility;
  • “[t]he principles underlying our decision in Chevron apply with full force in the tax context”;
  • “the administrative landscape has changed significantly” since the Court counseled less deference for general authority Treasury regulations in Rowan Cos. v. United States, 452 U.S. 247, 253 91981), and United States v. Vogel Fertilizer Co., 455 U.S. 16, 24 (1982);
  • the determination of a regulation’s eligibility for Chevron deference “does not turn on whether Congress’s delegation of authority was general or specific”; and finally,
  • Chevron and Mead, rather than National Muffler and Rowan, provide the appropriate framework for evaluating” Treas. Reg. § 31.3121(b)(10)-2.

Chief Justice Roberts wrote the opinion on behalf of all eight participating members of the Court; Justice Kagan did not participate in the case.  It is hard to see how the Court could have been much clearer in rejecting the National Muffler standard and embracing Chevron and Mead for evaluating tax cases.

The Court’s opinion also offered a short passage with potential implications beyond the standard of review question.  In the course of rejecting the National Muffler standard, the Court offered the following statement:  “[W]e are not inclined to carve out an approach to administrative review good for tax law only.  To the contrary, we have expressly ‘[r]ecogniz[ed] the importance of maintaining a uniform approach to judicial review of administrative action.’”  The Court quoted Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150 (1999), a non-tax (patent) case with an extensive discussion regarding Congress’s intent that the Administrative Procedure Act bring uniformity to the otherwise disparate field of federal administrative action.  The Court also cited Skinner v. Mid-America Pipeline Co., 490 U.S. 212 (1989), for “declining to apply ‘a different and stricter nondelegation doctrine in cases where Congress delegates discretionary authority to the Executive under its taxing power.’”  Other turns of phrase within the Court’s analysis reflect a similar orientation toward equating the tax and non-tax contexts.  A number of cases currently pending in the federal courts of appeals challenge Treasury regulations and IRS guidance documents on Administrative Procedure Act grounds.  The government’s arguments in those cases generally follow the same “tax is different” theme that taxpayers advanced in the Chevron versus National Muffler debate.  It will be interesting to see whether this passage from Mayo will influence the outcomes of those cases and pull the tax community even further toward administrative law norms.

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Comments

If specific authority and general authority Regs are equal, functionally the same thing, then why does Congress every need to create laws establishing specific authority Regs and what purpose does 7805 serve?

If general authority Regs get Chevron deference, why does Congress ever have to enact law for specific authority Regs?

The Code must be read as a whole to make sure that it is consistent. The very fact that there are two types of Regs means that they are different. If they are different, how can they be treated the same?

The State can give you the authority to buy cigarettes. Your mom can give you the authority to buy cigarettes. Are these two different authorities (the legislature and the regulator) entitled to the same of deference? Is the regulator's authority equal to the legislature's? The first answers to no one, the second answers to the public at the ballot box. To change the law the legislature must pass a bill in both houses and have it signed into law by the President. The regulator can change the law by fiat (plus notice and comment to seal it air tight) and answers to no one.

Thus, an Agency as regulator may regulate; however, a delegation of authority by the legislature (legislative authority) is a delegation of a much stronger power. Remember, the first Article of the Constitution regards the Legislative Branch of government (so you can see who the writers thought was most important--an I am not an originalist so no worries about going down that road). I believe Article I is also the longest Article in the Constitution, but that is neither here nor there. I firmly believe that a legislative delegation of authority is vastly different, and subject to different standards, than a regulator regulating pursuant to its general ability to regulate.

Posted by: tax guy | Jan 14, 2011 6:52:23 PM