Tax Court: L.A. Tax Attorney-CPA Can Deduct Travel Costs to Do Research in Chapman Law School Library; Court Rejects IRS's Argument That There Were Adequate Law Libraries in L.A.

In Berge v. Commissioner, T.C. Summ. Op. 2006-29 (2/21/06) the Tax Court today permitted an L.A. tax lawyer-CPA to deduct the cost of driving to the Chapman Law Library (approximately thirty-five miles away) to do tax research, despite the IRS's argument that the trips were for personal purposes to visit his family because there were adequate libraries for him to use in L.A.:

Petitioner testified in response to respondent’s questioning that: (1) His family lived in Orange County; (2) approximately 60 of the trips or approximately 4,300 of the claimed miles on the trip sheet were to Chapman Law School Library, located in Orange County; and (3) there were law school libraries closer than Chapman Law School Library to petitioner’s Arthur Anderson, LLP office and his home in Los Angeles, California, one of which was the Southwestern University School of Law Library. In other words, respondent argues that petitioner should have conducted his legal research at a law library that was closer to petitioner’s home and work office than the Chapman Law School Library. Respondent argues that, since the primary reason petitioner traveled to the Chapman Law School Library was to visit his family, the mileage associated with this travel is not deductible under section 262 as a personal expense....

Petitioner testified, at trial, that the primary reason for his trips to Chapman Law School Library was to conduct legal research for his business clients. Further, petitioner testified that he found the Chapman Law School Library was superior to the libraries that were closer to his residence.

Upon the basis of the record in this case, we find that the primary purpose for petitioner’s trips to Chapman Law School Library was to conduct legal research for his business clients, and, therefore, said travel is directly connected to petitioner’s business. Petitioner’s visits to his family, if such visits occurred, were a secondary consideration. We hold for petitioner on this issue,